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I.  INTRODUCTION1 
 
 1. Bibliographic Note:  This note alphabetically lists sources repeatedly cited in this Article:   
  Adam C. Abrahms, Note, Closing the Immigration Loophole:  The 14th Amendment's 
Jurisdiction Requirement, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 469 (1998).   
  Richard L. Aynes, Enforcing the Bill of Rights Against the States: The History and the 
Future, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 77 (2009).   
  Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291 (2007).   
  HORACE BINNEY, THE ALIENIGENAE OF THE UNITED STATES UNDER THE PRESENT 
NATURALIZATION LAWS (Philadelphia, C. Sherman ed., 2d ed. 1853).   
  JAMES E. BOND, NO EASY WALK TO FREEDOM:  RECONSTRUCTION AND THE 
RATIFICATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1997).   
  JOHN BOUVIER, A LAW DICTIONARY (Philadelphia, George W. Childs ed., 11th ed. 1862).   
  Patrick J. Charles, Decoding the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause:  Unlawful 
Immigrants, Allegiance, Personal Subjection, and the Law, 51 WASHBURN L.J. (forthcoming 2012), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1944018.   
  FELIX S. COHEN, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 
(1942).   
  CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1st SESS. (1866) [hereinafter GLOBE].   
  A DIGEST OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (Francis Wharton ed., 
Washington, W.H. Lowdermilk & Co. 2d ed. 1888) [hereinafter WHARTON].   
  John C. Eastman, HERITAGE FOUND., FROM FEUDALISM TO CONSENT:  RETHINKING 
BIRTHRIGHT CITIZENSHIP (2006), available at 
http://s3.amazonaws.com/thf_media/2006/pdf/lm18.pdf.   
  Garrett Epps, The Citizenship Clause, A “Legislative History”, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 331 
(2011).   
  TIMOTHY FARRAR, MANUAL OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
(Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1867).   
  Jon Feere, CTR. FOR IMMIGR. STUD., BIRTHRIGHT CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES:  A 
GLOBAL COMPARISON (2010), available at http://www.cis.org/articles/2010/birthright.pdf.   
  Christopher R. Green, The Original Sense of the (Equal) Protection Clause:  Pre-
Enactment History, 19 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 1 (2008).   
  Mark D. Greenberg & Harry Litman, The Meaning of Original Meaning, 86 GEO. L.J. 569 
(1998).   
  JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW (William Kent ed., Boston, Little, 
Brown & Co. 9th ed. 1858).   
  JAMES H. KETTNER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP, 1608-1870 (1978). 
  Kurt T. Lash, The Origins of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, Part I:  “Privileges and 
Immunities” as an Antebellum Term of Art, 98 GEO. L.J. 1241 (2008).   
  Gerard N. Magliocca, Indians and Invaders:  The Citizenship Clause and Illegal Aliens, 
10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 499 (2008).   
  William Ty Mayton, Birthright Citizenship and the Civic Minimum, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 
221 (2008).   
  GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION:  IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND 
FUNDAMENTAL LAW (1996).   
  FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER:  THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND 
THE AMERICAN INDIANS (1984).   
  Report from Hamilton Fish, Sec’y of State, U.S., to Ulysses S. Grant, President, U.S. 
(Aug. 25, 1873), in 2 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1186 
(Washington, D.C., Gov’t Printing Office 1873) [hereinafter Fish].   
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Ms. X, a Mexican citizen, enters the United States illegally, and 
gives birth to a child on American soil.  Ms. X is a civilian, and is not a 
diplomat.  Is her child constitutionally entitled to American citizenship 
at birth?  The thesis of this Article is that, under the original meaning of 
the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the correct answer 
to this question is “Yes.”   
For many constitutional lawyers, this answer merely restates the 
obvious.  After all, the Citizenship Clause plainly declares that “All 
persons born . . . in the United States . . . are citizens of the United 
States,” and only excludes those not “subject to the jurisdiction” of the 
United States at birth.2  “Jurisdiction” is conventionally understood to 
mean “sovereign authority,” or “[a] government’s general power to 
exercise authority over all persons and things within its territory . . . .”3  
Hence, under this “orthodox interpretation,” the Clause’s “jurisdiction 
 
  Report from Daniel Webster, Sec’y of State, U.S., to Millard Fillmore, President, U.S. 
(Dec. 23, 1851), in 6 THE WORKS OF DANIEL WEBSTER 521 (Boston, Little & Brown 11th ed. 1858) 
[hereinafter Webster].   
  WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
(2d ed., photo. reprint 2003) (1829).   
  PETER H. SCHUCK & ROGERS M. SMITH, CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT CONSENT:  ILLEGAL 
ALIENS IN THE AMERICAN POLITY (1985).   
  Mark Shawhan, Comment, The Significance of Domicile in Lyman Trumbull’s Conception 
of Citizenship, 119 YALE L.J. 101 (2010) [hereinafter Shawhan, Domicile].   
  Mark Shawhan, ‘By Virtue of Being Born Here’:  Birthright Citizenship and the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866, 15 HARV. LATINO L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) [hereinafter Shawhan, Virtue], 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1675876.   
  Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism (Ill. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper 
Series, No. 07-24, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1120244.   
  SPEECHES OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1866 IN THE STATES OF OHIO, INDIANA, AND KENTUCKY 
(Cincinnati, Cin. Com. 1866) [hereinafter CAMPAIGN SPEECHES].   
  Howard Sutherland, Citizen Hamdi:  The Case Against Birthright Citizenship, AM. 
CONSERVATIVE, Sept. 27, 2004, http://www.amconmag.com/article/2004/sep/27/00021/.   
  I-MIEN TSIANG, THE QUESTION OF EXPATRIATION IN AMERICA PRIOR TO 1907 (1942).   
  EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW 
(Charles G. Fenwick trans., Carnegie Inst. of Wash. 1916) (1758).   
  FRANCIS A. WALKER, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, A COMPENDIUM OF THE NINTH 
CENSUS (Washington, D.C., Gov’t Printing Office 1872).   
  2 WAR OF THE REBELLION:  A COMPILATION OF THE OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE UNION 
AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES, SER. III (Washington, D.C., Gov’t Printing Office 1899) [hereinafter 
RECORDS].   
  Bryan H. Wildenthal, Nationalizing the Bill of Rights:  Revisiting the Original 
Understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1866-67, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1509 (2007).   
  David C. Williams, The Borders of the Equal Protection Clause:  Indians as Peoples, 38 
UCLA L. REV. 759 (1991).   
 2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, 
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they 
reside.”).   
 3. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 927 (9th ed. 2009).   
3
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requirement”4 only excludes children of diplomats, children born to 
invading alien enemies in enemy-occupied territory, and children born 
aboard a foreign sovereign’s ships.5  Even though Ms. X is an illegal 
alien, her child remains subject to U.S. sovereign authority.6  Thus, the 
child is entitled to birthright citizenship.7   
Yet for those concerned with the “original meaning” of the 
Constitution, the answer to the above question may be less clear.  
Recently, some have contended that, under the original meaning of the 
jurisdiction requirement, a child’s parents needed to have federal 
permission for their presence on American soil.8  In addition, these 
parents had to owe “undivided allegiance”9 to the United States, via “the 
absence of any [foreign] allegiance . . . .”10  Under this interpretation, the 
Citizenship Clause would not apply to Ms. X’s child because Ms. X 
owes allegiance to Mexico and is in the United States without federal 
consent.11  Instead, such children would either follow the nationality of 
their parents via jus sanguinis,12 or suffer statelessness.  Unsurprisingly, 
 
 4. SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 1, at 5-6 (employing this label for the Clause’s qualifier).   
 5. See United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 682-86 (1898).   
 6. See, e.g., Epps, supra note 1, at 333 (discussing various ways in which an illegal alien’s 
child is subject to sovereign power).  This Article uses the phrase “illegal alien,” not to disparage 
non-citizens unlawfully present in the United States, but “because it is the most common one in 
public discourse.”  Magliocca, supra note 1, at 499 n.3.  See also BRYAN A. GARNER, A 
DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE 899 (2d ed. 1995) (“Illegal alien is not an opprobrious 
epithet:  it describes one present in a country in violation of the immigration laws (hence 
‘illegal’).”).   
 7. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 7 FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL § 1111(d) (2009) (“All 
children born in and subject, at the time of birth, to the jurisdiction of the United States acquire U.S. 
citizenship at birth even if their parents were in the United States illegally at the time of birth.”) 
(emphasis in original).   
 8. See SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 1, at 86 (“In the public law view . . . [parents’] consent 
was . . . taken provisionally to stand for that of the child.”); id. (suggesting that children received 
birthright citizenship only when “the government consented to the individual’s presence and status . 
. . .”).   
 9. Sutherland, supra note 1 (stating that an alien owes “undivided allegiance to the United 
States” when he “renounces all allegiance to his homeland . . . .”).   
 10. SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 1, at 86.   
 11. See id. at 94 (“[Illegal aliens] are . . . individuals whose presence within the jurisdiction of 
the United States is prohibited by law.  They are manifestly individuals . . . to whom the society has 
explicitly and self-consciously decided to deny membership.”); Lino A. Graglia, Birthright 
Citizenship for Children of Illegal Aliens:  An Irrational Public Policy, 14 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 1, 8 
(2009) (concluding that a parental allegiance requirement would “exclude birthright citizenship for 
the children of legal resident aliens and, a fortiori, of illegal aliens.”).   
 12. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 941 (9th ed. 2009) (defining jus sanguinis as, “The rule 
that a child’s citizenship is determined by the parents’ citizenship.”); Mayton, supra note 1, at 247 
(“[T]he child can be expected to absorb the habits of allegiance and affiliation of his or her 
parents.”).  Of course, this assumes that the laws of an illegal alien’s homeland confer derivative 
citizenship upon that alien’s U.S.-born children.   
4
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this “consensualist interpretation” has gained currency among critics of 
illegal immigration, including political commentators,13 think-tanks,14 
legal scholars,15 judges,16 and legislators seeking to restrict birthright 
citizenship via statute.17   
This Article contends that the orthodox interpretation accurately 
reflects the original public meaning18 of ‘jurisdiction,’ and that, 
consequently, the consensualist interpretation is incorrect on originalist 
grounds.  By way of supporting this contention, this Article also seeks to 
advance the debate regarding the Citizenship Clause in several ways.  
Although this Article, like others,19 relies upon the Clause’s legislative 
history for evidence of original meaning, when analyzing that history 
this Article also considers 1) the framing-era context of federal Indian 
law; and 2) the distinction between “original meaning” and “original 
expected application.”20  Moreover, in seeking relevant originalist 
 
 13. See, e.g., Sutherland, supra note 1; George F. Will, Op-Ed., An Argument to be Made 
About Immigrant Babies and Citizenship, WASH. POST, Mar. 28, 2010, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/26/AR2010032603077.html.   
 14. See, e.g., Brief for The Center for American Unity et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondents at 9-15, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (No. 03-6696); Brief for The 
Claremont Institute for Constitutional Jurisprudence as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 
5-9, Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507 (No. 03-6696); Brief for Eagle Institute Education & Legal Defense Fund 
as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 4-7, Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507 (No. 03-6696); EASTMAN, 
supra note 1, at 2-8; FEERE, supra note 1, at 6-11.   
 15. See, e.g., EASTMAN, supra note 1, at 2-8; SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 1, at 72-86; 
Mayton, supra note 1, at 241-53; Abrahms, supra note 1, at 477-87.   
 16. See Oforji v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 609, 621 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J., concurring) (“A 
constitutional amendment may be required to change the rule whereby birth in this country 
automatically confers U.S. citizenship, but I doubt it.”).   
 17. See, e.g., 154 CONG. REC. H446 (daily ed. Jan. 23, 2008) (statement of Rep. Poe) 
(“[Illegal aliens are] not subject to the jurisdiction of the country when they fraudulently came in 
here.  They’re subject to the jurisdiction of the country that they came from.”).  See also 153 CONG. 
REC. H2287 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 2007) (statement of Rep. Bilbray); 147 CONG. REC. 1202 (2001) 
(statement of Rep. Stump); 137 CONG. REC. 27090 (1991) (statement of Rep. Galleghy).  One such 
proposal is the Birthright Citizenship Act of 2011, H.R. 140, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011).  See also 
MARGARET MIKYUNG LEE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33079, U.S. CITIZENSHIP OF PERSONS 
BORN IN THE UNITED STATES TO ALIEN PARENTS 11-13 (2007) (analyzing such proposals).   
 18. By “original public meaning,” I am referring to “the objective original meaning that a 
reasonable listener would place on the words used in the constitutional provision at the time of its 
enactment.”  Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 621 
(1999).  Because basing constitutional interpretation on framers’ intent is methodologically 
problematic, Solum, supra note 1, at 14-15, this Article accords weight to such “original intentions” 
only insofar as they “reflect or illuminate the likely public understanding of the proposed 
constitutional text.”  Lash, supra note 1, at 1248.   
 19. See, e.g., Epps, supra note 1, at 349-62; Magliocca, supra note 1, at 518-22.   
 20. Balkin, supra note 1, at 296 (“Original expected application asks how people living at the 
time the text was adopted would have expected it would be applied using language in its ordinary 
sense (along with any legal terms of art).”); Solum, supra note 1, at 20 (“The meaning of a text is 
one thing; expectations about the application of that meaning to future cases are a different thing.”).   
5
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evidence, this Article looks to the heretofore-neglected Fourteenth 
Amendment ratification debates, and the periods preceding and 
following the Clause’s enactment.   
Given the ongoing controversy regarding originalism’s normative 
value,21 a brief justification for this Article’s originalist focus may be 
warranted.  First, because both originalists and non-originalists agree 
that original meaning is relevant to constitutional adjudication,22 
ascertaining the Citizenship Clause’s original meaning is worthwhile 
regardless of one’s position in the aforementioned controversy.  Second, 
courts at various levels have shown an interest in original meaning when 
deciding constitutional questions.23  Third, because consensualists often 
label their interpretation “originalist,”24 fully responding to their 
challenge requires direct engagement of their originalist arguments.  
Finally, if consensualists are indeed wrong as a matter of original 
meaning, it is incumbent upon other originalists to highlight and refute 
such errors as a matter of intellectual honesty.   
This Article proceeds in five parts, of which this Introduction is the 
first.  Part II describes the antebellum linguistic context that preceded the 
Citizenship Clause.  Part III presents evidence showing that “subject to 
the jurisdiction” originally meant “subject to sovereign authority.”25  
 
 21. See, e.g., Solum, supra note 1, at 22-24 (discussing this controversy).   
 22. Compare Lash, supra note 1, at 1247 (“[Original public meaning] originalism has been 
embraced by a wide range of constitutional historians of various ideological persuasions . . . .”), 
with Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 8 (2009) (“[W]e can all care 
about . . . original public meaning without being originalists.”), and Stephen M. Griffin, Rebooting 
Originalism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1185, 1187 (conceding originalism’s legitimacy as “one form of 
interpretation among others . . . .”).   
 23. See, e.g., McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3058-83 (2010) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (Privileges or Immunities Clause); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) 
(Second Amendment); Report & Recommendation on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Count 14 at 
13, United States v. Boffil-Rivera, No. 08-20437-CR-GRAHAM/TORRES (S.D. Fla. Aug. 12, 2008) 
(denying Second Amendment’s applicability to illegal aliens), aff’d, 607 F.3d 736 (11th Cir. 2010).   
 24. See, e.g., EASTMAN, supra note 1, at 8 (suggesting that the judiciary “restor[e] to the 
[Citizenship Clause] what its drafters actually intended:  that only a complete jurisdiction, of the 
kind that brings with it a total and exclusive allegiance, is sufficient to qualify for [birthright 
citizenship] . . . .”).  This consensualist focus on “original intent” is odd, given the well-known 
problems with “original intent originalism.”  See, e.g., Solum, supra note 1, at 14-15.  However, if 
the framers did intend to constitutionalize consensualism, presumably they employed words whose 
meanings were consistent with this goal.  Thus, consensualists’ claims regarding framers’ intent 
imply a consensualist original meaning for the jurisdiction requirement.   
  Some consensualists instead deem the Clause’s language “ambiguous.”  SCHUCK & 
SMITH, supra note 1, at 117.  Given the evidence presented by this Article, I leave it for the reader 
to judge the accuracy of such claims.   
 25. Or, even more colloquially, “subject to the civil and criminal laws of the land.”    
6
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Part IV critiques various consensualist arguments.  Part V, the 
Conclusion, summarizes this Article’s findings.   
II.  THE CITIZENSHIP CLAUSE IN CONTEXT 
In antebellum common law, a child was a citizen at birth if born 
within the territory of a sovereign and under the sovereign’s authority.26  
This was true even if the child’s parents were aliens.27  It was this 
“common-law rule” that the framers sought to constitutionalize,28 via the 
 
 26. See, e.g., Inglis v. Trustees of Sailor’s Snug Harbor, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 99, 155 (1830) 
(Story, J., dissenting) (“[T]he party must be born within a place where the sovereign is at the time in 
full possession and exercise of his power . . . .”); GLOBE, supra note 1, at 527 (statement of Sen. 
Trumbull, R-Ill.) (“[A]ll these persons born in the United States and under its authority . . . are 
citizens without any act of Congress.”); id. at 2765 (statement of Sen. Howard, R-Mich.) (“A citizen 
of the United States is held by the courts to be a person who was born within the limits of the United 
States and subject to their laws.”); Shawhan, Virtue, supra note 1 (manuscript at 8) (noting the 
“territory and authority criteria” of the common-law rule).  Subjection to authority also implied 
allegiance.  Cf. Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 138-39 (1812) (noting that, 
absent diplomatic immunity, an ambassador “would owe temporary and local allegiance to a foreign 
prince . . . .”).  Hence, writers referred to birth under the “exercise of [a sovereign’s] power” as birth 
“within the allegiance” or “within the ligeance of the sovereign.”  Inglis, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) at 155.  
See, e.g., United States v. Rhodes, 27 F. Cas. 785, 789 (C.C.D. Ky. 1866) (No. 16,151); Kilham v. 
Ward, 2 Mass. 236, 238, 1 Tyng 221, 223 (1806); Lynch v. Clarke, 1 Sand. Ch. 583, 663 (N.Y. Ch. 
1844); 2 KENT, supra note 1, at *39.  But see Charles, supra note 1 (manuscript at 8-9) (asserting 
that “within the allegiance” implies a consent requirement).   
  Note that Story dissented in Inglis because he “differ[ed] from [the opinion] of the Court” 
regarding “the nature and effect of a devise” in a will.  Inglis, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) at 154; compare id. at 
112-20 (majority opinion) (deeming the devise valid, and a corporation devisee), with id. at 145-54 
(Story, J., dissenting) (deeming the devise invalid, and concluding that heirs are entitled to the 
estate).  However, Story’s view regarding “the alienage of the demandant . . . coincide[d] generally 
with that of the majority of the Court . . . .”  Id. at 145.  The majority’s failure to dispute Story’s 
explication of the common-law rule, and the consistency of Story’s views with those of other 
authorities, also militate in favor of relying on Story’s explication.  See id. at 120-27 (majority 
opinion); infra note 27.   
 27. See Inglis, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) at 164; Munro v. Merchant, 28 N.Y. 9, 40 (1863); Ludlam v. 
Ludlam, 26 N.Y. 356, 371 (1863); Munro v. Merchant, 26 Barb. 383, 400 (N.Y. 1858), rev’d on 
other grounds, 28 N.Y. 9 (1863); Lynch, 1 Sand. Ch. at 663; Town of Lyndon v. Town of Danville, 
28 Vt. 809, 816 (1856) (Opinion of Isham, J.); 10 Op. Att’y Gen. 328, 328 (1862); 10 Op. Att’y 
Gen. 329, 330 (1862); 9 Op. Att’y Gen. 373, 374 (1859); BINNEY, supra note 1, at 22 n.*; 2 KENT, 
supra note 1, at *39; RAWLE, supra note 1, at 86; William L. Marcy, Letter to the Editor, Native 
Sons of Alien Parents, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1854, at 3.   
  In 1863 William Lawrence suggested that children “born here of foreign parents” were 
not citizens; but the communiqué Lawrence cited was silent regarding the citizenship of such 
children.  Compare HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 903 (William Beach 
Lawrence ed., Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 2d ed. 1863), with Letter from William H. Seward, 
Sec’y of State, U.S., to William Stuart, Charge d’Affaires, U.K. (Aug. 20, 1862), in MESSAGE OF 
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 283, 283 (Washington, D.C., Gov’t Printing Office 1862).   
 28. See, e.g., GLOBE, supra note 1, at 2890 (statement of Sen. Howard, R-Mich.) (noting that 
the Clause “is simply declaratory of what I regard as the law of the land already . . . .”).  Because the 
7
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Citizenship Clause’s two-fold requirement of birth “in the United States, 
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof.”29  In drafting the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the framers drew on preexisting legal terminology.30  
Hence, if “jurisdiction” originally meant “sovereign authority” at the 
framing, we should expect to see this meaning used in antebellum 
discourse.  A variety of sources demonstrate that it was.   
For instance, the orthodox interpretation was often employed by 
antebellum legal commentators.  In his path-breaking disquisition, St. 
George Tucker wrote, “each state . . . retains an uncontrolled jurisdiction 
over all cases of municipal law . . . .”31  William Rawle, in his View of 
the Constitution, observed that, “The geographical limits of the United 
States and those of the territories, are subject to the jurisdiction of all the 
courts of the United States . . . .”32  In his Commentaries on the 
Constitution of the United States, Justice Joseph Story noted that the 
federal judiciary was “authorized to exercise jurisdiction to the full 
extent of the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States . . . .”33  
James Kent, in his Commentaries on American Law, wrote, 
“ambassadors were exempted from all local jurisdiction, civil and 
criminal . . . .”34   
The orthodox interpretation also appears in 1860s federal court 
cases.  A federal slave trade case described a defendant as being “held 
subject to the jurisdiction of this court . . . .”35  A federal district court 
noted a defendant’s argument that a particular boat “was not therefore 
subject to the jurisdiction of this court, as a court of admiralty, at the 
time of her seizure and arrest.”36  In an insurance dispute, a federal 
circuit court rejected arguments that Aetna was “not subject to the 
 
39th Congress drafted the Fourteenth Amendment, this Article provides the state and party 
affiliation for each of its members, to help place their statements in context.   
 29. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 1.   
 30. See Lash, supra note 1, at 1246 (noting that the framers’ “use of particular phrases and 
concepts reflected legal meanings and ideas that had emerged in antebellum judicial cases and legal 
commentary . . . .”).   
 31. 1 BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES:  WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE TO THE CONSTITUTION 
AND LAWS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES; AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH 
OF VIRGINIA app. at 152 (St. George Tucker  ed., Philadelphia, William Young Birch & Abraham 
Small 1803).  For similar usage, see also id. at 285, 313.   
 32. RAWLE, supra note 1, at 236.  For similar usage, see also id. at 201, 207, 252.   
 33. 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1646, 
at 451 (William S. Hein & Co. 1994) (1833).  For similar usage, see also id. § 1662, at 464; id. § 
1665, at 465.   
 34. 1 KENT, supra note 1, at *15.  For similar usage, see also id. at *26, *45, *103, *130, 
*341.   
 35. United States v. Corrie, 25 F. Cas. 658, 659 (C.C.D.S.C. 1860) (No. 14,869).   
 36. McAllister v. The Sam Kirkman, 15 F. Cas. 1204, 1205 (S.D. Ohio 1860) (No. 8,658).   
8
Akron Law Review, Vol. 45 [2012], Iss. 3, Art. 6
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol45/iss3/6
12- ING_MACRO.DOCM 7/12/2012  3:41 PM 
2012] CITIZENSHIP CLAUSE 727 
jurisdiction of this court, in controversies with citizens of Ohio.”37  
When discussing a prior Supreme Court case, another circuit court noted 
a railroad’s contention that “certain persons were . . . not subject to the 
jurisdiction of the court.”38   
State courts showed similar usage.  A Louisiana decision observed 
that a deceased debtor “was subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of 
Mississippi”39 before his death.  An Iowa case considered, and rejected, 
an appellant’s argument that a piece of property was “not subject to the 
jurisdiction of”40 the city of Mount Pleasant.  In 1862, the California 
Supreme Court noted the defendants’ argument that a given claim “was 
not subject to the jurisdiction of the United States board of land 
commissioners . . . .”41  A Minnesota case considered whether “a foreign 
corporation [should] be subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this 
state when it has property therein . . . .”42  A Pennsylvania case denied 
the reach of summary power over “[o]utside parties who in none of the 
recognised modes have previously become subject to the jurisdiction of 
the court . . . .”43  An Illinois decision denied that a soldier was “subject 
to the jurisdiction of the United States, and not to that of the State of 
Illinois.”44  Other cases likewise employed the orthodox interpretation.45   
In the years leading up to the Fourteenth Amendment, members of 
Congress also equated “jurisdiction” with “sovereign authority.”  For 
example, during the 1861 secession crisis, Sen. John Crittenden asserted 
that only arsenals, navy yards, and dock yards in the seceding states 
were “specially subject to the jurisdiction of the United States in the 
States . . . .”46  In 1862, Sen. John Hale labeled an army without 
commissioned officers “a mob, not even subject to the jurisdiction to 
 
 37. Lee v. Aetna Ins. Co., 15 F. Cas. 141, 142 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1861) (No. 8,181).   
 38. McCloskey v. Cobb, 15 F. Cas. 1278, 1280 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1866) (No. 8,702).   
 39. Mandeville v. Huston, 15 La. Ann. 281, 282 (1860).   
 40. Burlington & Mo. River R.R. Co. v. Spearman, 12 Iowa 112, 114-15 (1861).   
 41. Leese v. Clark, 20 Cal. 387, 411 (1862).   
 42. Broome v. Galena, D., D. & Minn. Packet Co., 9 Minn. 239, 244 (1864).   
 43. The Allegheny Bank’s Appeal, 48 Pa. 328, 333 (1864).   
 44. Huggins v. People, 39 Ill. 241, 245 (1866).   
 45. See, e.g., Golden v. Cockril, 1 Kan. 259, 270 (1862); Nutter v. Russell, 60 Ky. 163, 166 
(1860); Ludeling v. Vester, 16 La. Ann. 450, 452 (1862); Templeton v. Morgan, 16 La. Ann. 438, 
441 (1862); Poutz v. Bistes, 15 La. Ann. 636, 637 (1860); Norton v. Sterling, 15 La. Ann. 399 
(1860); Hood v. Hood, 93 Mass. 196, 200 (1865); Cahoon v. Harlow, 89 Mass. 151, 152 (1863); 
Moody v. Gay, 81 Mass. 457 (1860); Chilvers v. People, 11 Mich. 43, 56 (1862) (Martin, C.J., 
dissenting); Sullivan v. La Crosse & Minn. Steam Packet Co., 10 Minn. 386, 391 (1865); Richard v. 
Mooney, 39 Miss. 357, 358 (1860); Steele ex rel. Milroy v. Farber, 37 Mo. 71, 78 (1865); Hunt v. 
Mayberry, 29 N.J.L. 403, 407 (1862); Moore v. Fields, 42 Pa. 467, 472 (1862); Horner v. 
Hasbrouck, 41 Pa. 169, 179 (1862).   
 46. CONG. GLOBE, 36TH CONG., 2d SESS. 1377 (1861) (statement of Sen. Crittenden).   
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which Peter the Hermit was . . . .”47  In 1864, Sen. Reverdy Johnson 
suggested that intra-state property over which the federal government 
exercised eminent domain “ought not to be subject to the jurisdiction of 
the States.”48  In 1865, Rep. James Ashley argued that “the territory [of 
the rebel States] and the citizens residing therein are subject to the 
jurisdiction of Congress the same as citizens in any Territory of the 
United States.”49  Finally, when defending the Citizenship Clause in 
1866, Rep. Jehu Baker argued that “Persons born or naturalized in the 
United States, and subject to its jurisdiction, subject to taxation, to 
military service . . . ought . . . to receive in turn . . . the status of 
citizenship.”50 
Unsurprisingly, this consistent usage was reflected in antebellum 
American dictionaries.  For example, Bouvier’s widely-used Law 
Dictionary gave the following definition:  “A power constitutionally 
conferred upon a judge or magistrate, to take cognizance of, and decide 
causes according to law, and to carry his sentence into execution.”51  
Giles Jacob’s Law Dictionary defined “jurisdiction” as “[a]n authority or 
power, which a man hath to do justice in causes of complaint brought 
before him . . . .”52  According to Noah Webster’s classic reference 
 
 47. CONG. GLOBE, 37TH CONG., 2d SESS. 1881 (1862) (statement of Sen. Hale).   
 48. CONG. GLOBE, 38TH CONG., 1st SESS. 1479 (1864) (statement of Sen. Johnson).   
 49. CONG. GLOBE, 38TH CONG., 2d SESS. 140 (1865) (statement of Rep. Ashley).  See also id. 
at 223 (statement of Rep. Pendleton) (“He holds that an act of secession . . . destroys . . . [a State’s] 
form of Government, leaving [its people] subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Government and 
its absolute sovereignty with all the rights of local government . . . .”).   
 50. GLOBE, supra note 1, app. at 256 (statement of Rep. Baker, R-Ill.).  See also id. app. at 
100 (statement of Sen. Yates, R-Ill.) (asserting that “it is not only our right but our duty to extend 
the suffrage to every American citizen in every State, and to all the country subject to the 
jurisdiction of the United States.”); id. at 2853 (statement of Sen. Morrill, R-Me.) (“While the 
colonies were integral parts of Great Britain they were, of course, subject to the jurisdiction of Great 
Britain, and it was idle to talk about sovereignty in colonies.”); id. at 1472 (statement of Rep. 
Dumont, R-Ind.) (“Those who entertain this theory call it being out of the Union, though the 
territory of the State and the people are still subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Government.”); 
id. at 3821 (statement of Rep. Eldredge, D-Wis.) (“I desire to raise the question of order, whether 
the gentlemen named in the third resolution of the majority of the committee were subject to the 
jurisdiction of that committee.”); id. at 3580 (statement of Sen. Saulsbury, D-Del.) (“[W]ould it not 
be competent then for Congress to cede the District to Maryland and Virginia if it saw proper, or 
must it forever retain these ten miles square subject to the jurisdiction of Congress?”).   
 51. 1 BOUVIER, supra note 1, at 683.  Regarding the prominence of Bouvier’s dictionary, see 
Mary Whisner, Bouvier’s, Black’s, and Tinkerbell, 92 LAW LIB. J. 99 (2000) (quoting MORRIS L. 
COHEN ET AL., HOW TO FIND THE LAW 412 (9th ed. 1989)) (“For almost a hundred years, the 
numerous editions of John Bouvier’s A Law Dictionary were most popular among American 
lawyers.”).   
 52. 3 GILES JACOB & T. E. TOMLINS, THE LAW DICTIONARY 564 (Philadelphia & New York, 
P. Byrne & I. Riley 1811).   
10
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work, “jurisdiction” meant “[p]ower of governing or legislating . . . .”53  
Dictionaries by Samuel Johnson and J.J.S. Wharton gave similar 
definitions.54   
Compiling this “Framer’s Lexicon”55 is important for two reasons.  
First, it shows that the consensualist reading of “jurisdiction” has no 
basis in antebellum terminology; on the contrary, the leading nineteenth-
century legal dictionary observed that “the consent of parties, cannot, 
therefore, confer [jurisdiction] . . . .”56  Second, the consistent 
antebellum equation of “jurisdiction” with “sovereign authority” creates 
a presumption that both drafters and ratifiers employed this meaning 
when considering the Fourteenth Amendment.57  Nevertheless, it 
remains possible that the Citizenship Clause presaged a change in the 
definition of “jurisdiction.”58  Thus, it is necessary to examine the 
Clause’s legislative history and determine whether such a shift may have 
occurred.  As discussed below, however, no such shift is evident in that 
history, or in the later debates surrounding the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
ratification.   
III.  INDIANS, ALIENS, AND THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF “SUBJECT TO 
THE JURISDICTION THEREOF” 
Evidence from the framing and ratification of the Fourteenth 
Amendment also suggests that “jurisdiction” originally meant 
“sovereign authority.”  First, members of Congress employed this 
meaning when debating the Citizenship Clause.  Second, this meaning is 
consistent with original expected applications expressed in those 
debates.  Finally, the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification debates 
 
 53. CHAUNCEY A. GOODRICH, NOAH PORTER & NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN 
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 732 (Springfield, G. & C. Merriam 1865).  Other 
definitions included “[t]he legal power or authority of hearing and determining causes;” and “extent 
of power or authority.”  Id.   
 54. SAMUEL JOHNSON ET AL., A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 411 (London, 
William Pickering 2d ed. 1828); J.J.S. WHARTON, THE LAW LEXICON, OR DICTIONARY OF 
JURISPRUDENCE 525 (photo reprint, Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1987) (1848).   
 55. Green, supra note 1, at 44 (using this label to denote a similar compilation illustrating 
framing-era usage of “protection of the laws”).   
 56. 1 BOUVIER, supra note 1, at 683.   
 57. See Lash, supra note 1, at 1246 (“Understanding the antebellum [definitions] thus 
illuminates both how the members of Congress understood the development of [a proposed 
constitutional provision] and how the public at large likely understood the final version of that 
text.”).   
 58. See H. Jefferson Powell, Rules For Originalists, 73 VA. L. REV. 659, 679 (1987) 
(emphasis added) (“‘[D]efining’ the meaning of the founders’ language is always a matter of 
considering both the vocabulary they inherited and that which they created.”).   
11
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support the orthodox interpretation, as do many post-ratification 
authorities.   
A. Federal Indian Law and the Original Meaning of “Jurisdiction” 
At the time of the Fourteenth Amendment, American law excluded 
American Indians’ native-born children from birthright citizenship.59  
Although this exclusion was eventually abolished via statute,60 in 1866 it 
still commanded strong support.61  As such, when the Senate debated the 
Citizenship Clause, Fourteenth Amendment supporters had to explain 
why the Clause, as written, would exclude the children of Indians from 
its coverage.  Their opponents argued that the jurisdiction requirement 
would not exclude Indians, and that adding the phrase “excluding 
Indians not taxed” was therefore necessary.62  In response, supporters 
successfully63 argued that, because Indians were not “subject to the 
jurisdiction” of American law, no specific textual exclusion was 
required.   
Although this argument may strike contemporary observers as 
unusual, it was quite understandable in context, because most64 mid-
 
 59. See, e.g., Act of Apr. 9, 1866, Ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (excluding “Indians not taxed” from 
citizenship); KETTNER, supra note 1, at 293-300 (discussing Indians’ antebellum exclusion).   
 60. See Act of Jun. 2, 1924, Ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253.  Current law grants birthright citizenship to 
any “person born in the United States to a member of an Indian, Eskimo, Aleutian, or other 
aboriginal tribe . . . .”  8 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (2006).   
 61. See, e.g., GLOBE, supra note 1, at 2895 (statement of Sen. Howard, R-Mich.) (“I am not 
yet prepared to pass a sweeping act of naturalization by which all the Indian savages . . . are to 
become my fellow-citizens . . . .”); id. at 2897 (statement of Sen. Doolittle, R-Wis.) (deeming 
Indians “utterly unfit to be citizens of the United States . . . .”).  Although one scholar argues that 
the framers also excluded Indians out of respect for tribal autonomy, in fact several framers 
proposed discarding Indian treaties and directly governing Indians via federal law.  Compare 
Magliocca, supra note 1, at 515-21 (making this argument), with GLOBE, supra note 1, at 1488 
(statement of Sen. Trumbull, R-Ill.) (questioning “whether our whole policy in regard to the Indians 
in making what we call treaties with them is not wrong, and whether we ought not to take them 
under our care, and by legislation, without attempting to get up treaties in any shape, bring them 
within our jurisdiction, and extend our laws over them.”), and id. at 1488 (statement of Sen. 
Sherman, R-Ohio) (“Until that idea [of making treaties with Indians] is abandoned, you cannot 
make any regular system for these Indian tribes.”).   
 62. GLOBE, supra note 1, at 2890 (statement of Sen. Doolittle, R-Wis.).   
 63. The “excluding Indians not taxed” language was defeated 30-10.  See id. at 2897.   
 64. Although no precise numbers are available, several sources suggest that, in 1866, the vast 
majority of Indians were “Indians not taxed” exempt from federal jurisdiction.  The 1870 census 
counted 25,731 “civilized Indian[s]” and 357,981 “Indians not taxed.”  Compare WALKER, supra 
note 1, at 18 tbl.VI, with id. at 21 tbl.VII.  In 1860, the corresponding numbers were 36,662 and 
294,431.  Compare JOS. C. G. KENNEDY, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, PRELIMINARY REPORT ON 
THE EIGHTH CENSUS, 1860 app. 135 tbl.2 (Washington, D.C., Gov’t Printing Office 1862), with id. 
app. at 136 tbl.3.  Moreover, beyond these admittedly-underinclusive results, an 1891 report noted 
that, before 1887, only “3,072 members of various tribes had, by special laws and treaties, 
12
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nineteenth century Indians (like diplomats) were largely immune from 
the federal and state “sovereign authority” that applied to non-Indians.  
In “Indian country,”65 where these Indians lived, federal criminal 
jurisdiction only extended to crimes involving non-Indians.66  Intra-
Indian crimes were expressly exempted, and left to tribal law.67  Indians 
were also exempt from the federal courts’ civil jurisdiction.68  Nor did 
state jurisdiction extend to Indian country.69  Thus, unlike native-born 
children of citizens or aliens, an Indian born in Indian country was 
substantially immune from U.S. sovereign authority.   
With this special legal context in mind, Fourteenth Amendment 
supporters argued that because Indians in Indian country70 were largely 
 
previously become citizens.”  T.J. MORGAN, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, SIXTIETH ANNUAL 
REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN AFFAIRS TO THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR 21 
(Washington, D.C., Gov’t Printing Office 1891).   
 65. According to Felix Cohen, “[Indian country] may perhaps be most usefully defined as 
country within which Indian laws and customs and federal laws relating to Indians are generally 
applicable.”  COHEN, supra note 1, Ch. 1, § 3, at 5.  In 1866, Indian country consisted of “all that 
part of the United States west of the Mississippi, and not within the states of Missouri and 
Louisiana, or the territory of Arkansas, and, also, that part of the United States east of the 
Mississippi river, and not within any state to which the Indian title has not been extinguished . . . .”  
Act of June 30, 1834, Ch. 161, § 1, 4 Stat. 729, 729.  This definition still applied in 1866.  See 
COHEN, supra note 1, Ch. 1, § 3, at 6.   
 66. See 1 PRUCHA, supra note 1, at 104 (“[I]t was not until 1817 that Congress ordained 
punishment for Indians who committed crimes against whites within the Indian country.”).  Even 
this limited jurisdiction did not apply to Indian perpetrators punished by tribal law before federal 
prosecution.  See Act of Mar. 27, 1854, Ch. 26, § 3, 10 Stat. 269, 270.   
 67. See Act of June 30, 1834, Ch. 161, § 25, 4 Stat. 729, 733 (“Provided, The [federal 
criminal laws] shall not extend to crimes committed by one Indian against the person or property of 
another Indian.”); MATTHEW CARPENTER, EFFECT OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT UPON INDIAN 
TRIBES, S. REP. NO. 41-268, at 10 (1870) (“[T]he [United States] Government has carefully 
abstained . . . from punishing crimes committed by one Indian against another in the Indian 
country.”); H. EVERETT, REGULATING THE INDIAN DEPARTMENT, H.R. REP. NO. 23-474, at 13 
(1834) (“It is not perceived that we can with any justice or propriety extend our laws to offences 
committed by Indians against Indians, at any place within their own limits.”); 1 PRUCHA, supra note 
1, at 107 (noting that “offenses among Indians within the tribe or nation were tribal matters that 
were to be handled by the tribe,” and that “crimes committed by Indians against other Indians did 
not fall within the scope of the intercourse laws.”).  Note that Matthew Carpenter did not become a 
Senator until 1869, after the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification.  CARPENTER, Matthew Hale, 
(1824 - 1881), BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS, 
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=C000171 (last visited July 25, 2011).    
 68. See, e.g., GLOBE, supra note 1, at 571 (statement of Sen. Doolittle, R-Wis.) (“If you make 
[Indians] citizens . . . . They will not only have to right to sue, but they will be liable to be sued.”); 2 
PRUCHA, supra note 1, at 678-81 (discussing unsuccessful late-nineteenth-century proposals to 
extend civil jurisdiction over Indians).   
 69. See, e.g., The Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737 (1866); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 
U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); COHEN, supra note 1, Ch. 6, § 1, at 116.   
 70. Both supporters and opponents limited their discussions to these Indians.  See GLOBE, 
supra note 1, at 2892 (statement of Sen. Doolittle, R-Wis.) (“[T]here are seven or eight thousand 
13
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exempt from U.S. sovereign power, the jurisdiction requirement would 
exclude Indians from birthright citizenship.  Thus, responding to 
opponents, Senate Judiciary Chairman Lyman Trumbull rhetorically 
asked, “Can you sue a Navajoe Indian in court?”71  He also noted the 
lack of federal authority over intra-Indian crimes:  “Does the 
Government of the United States pretend to take jurisdiction of murders 
and robberies and other crimes committed by one Indian upon another?  
Are they subject to our jurisdiction in any just sense?  They are not 
subject to our jurisdiction.”72  He then reiterated his point at greater 
length:   
. . . [T]he Senator from Maryland, if he will look into our statutes, will 
search in vain for any means of trying these wild Indians. . . . We have 
had in this country, and have to-day, a large region of country within 
the territorial limits of the United States, unorganized, over which we 
do not pretend to exercise any civil or criminal jurisdiction, where wild 
tribes of Indians roam at pleasure, subject to their own laws and 
regulations, and we do not pretend to interfere with them.73   
Because Indians were thus immune from federal sovereign 
authority, they were not “subject to our laws,” and did not “come 
completely within our jurisdiction . . . .”74  As such, Trumbull 
concluded, “[t]hey would not be embraced by [the Citizenship 
Clause,]”75 unless they were “brought under our jurisdiction” via some 
 
Navajoes . . . in new Mexico, upon the Indian reservations . . . . Go into the State of Kansas, and you 
find any number of reservations . . . . So it is in other States. . . . Are these persons to be regarded as 
citizens of the United States . . . ?”); id. at 2894 (statement of Sen. Trumbull, R-Ill.) (referring to “a 
large region of country within the territorial limits of the United States, unorganized, over which we 
do not pretend to exercise any civil or criminal jurisdiction, where wild tribes of Indians roam at 
pleasure, subject to their own laws and regulations, and we do not pretend to interfere with them.”); 
id. at 2894 (statement of Sen. Hendricks, D-Ind.) (raising the possibility that the United States might 
“go into the Indian territory and subjugate the Indians to the political power of the country . . . .”).  
When Sen. Howard noted that “The United States courts have no power to punish an Indian who is 
connected with a tribe for a crime committed by him upon another member of the same tribe,” Sen. 
Fessenden clarified, “Within the [Indian] territory.”  Howard answered, “Yes sir.”  Id. at 2895 
(statement of Sen. Howard, R-Mich.); id. (statement of Sen. Fessenden, R-Me.).  But see Shawhan, 
Virtue, supra note 1 (manuscript at 65-66) (noting that Howard’s and Trumbull’s statements, read 
literally, could encompass Indians residing outside Indian country).   
 71. GLOBE, supra note 1, at 2893 (statement of Sen. Trumbull, R-Ill.).   
 72. Id.  
 73. Id. at 2894.   
 74. Id.  
 75. Id. 
14
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“special provision” authorizing federal punishment of intra-Indian 
crimes.76    
Sen. Jacob Howard, the Clause’s author and Amendment’s floor 
manager,77 likewise focused on Indians’ exclusion from federal 
jurisdiction.  He first equated “jurisdiction” with sovereign power, i.e., 
“a full and complete jurisdiction on the part of the United States, 
coextensive in all respects with the constitutional power of the United 
States, whether exercised by Congress, by the executive, or by the 
judicial department . . . .”78  Howard then explained that “an Indian 
belonging to a tribe, although born within the limits of a State,” was not 
“subject to this full and complete jurisdiction,” because such an Indian 
“is subject for crimes committed against the laws or usages of the tribe 
to the tribe itself, and not to any foreign or other tribunal.”79  Hence, 
“[b]ecause the jurisdiction of the [Indian] nation intervenes and ousts . . . 
[the] jurisdiction of the United States,” federal courts could not “punish 
an Indian who is connected with a tribe for a crime committed by him 
upon another member of the same tribe.”80  Thanks to these 
jurisdictional exemptions,81 an Indian was not subject to the same 
“extent and quality” of sovereign power applicable “to every citizen of 
the United States,”82 and was therefore ineligible for birthright 
citizenship.   
 
 76. Id. at 2893.  But see Charles, supra note 1 (manuscript at 18) (asserting that Trumbull’s 
statement implied consensualism).   
 77. Aynes, supra note 1, at 129, 130 n.292.   
 78. GLOBE, supra note 1, at 2895 (statement of Sen. Howard, R-Mich.).   
 79. Id.   
 80. Id.   
 81. These exemptions did not apply to citizens.  See, e.g., Act of June 30, 1834, Ch. 161, § 25, 
4 Stat. 729, 733 (exempting from federal jurisdiction only “crimes committed by one Indian against 
the person or property of another Indian.”).  See also Act of Mar. 3, 1843, Ch. 101, § 7, 5 Stat. 645, 
647 (deeming all Stockbridge Indians “citizens of the United States . . . subject to the laws of the 
United States and of the Territory of Wisconsin, in the same manner as other citizens of said 
Territory . . . .”); Act of Mar. 3, 1839, Ch. 83, § 7, 5 Stat. 349, 351 (similar); Treaty with the 
Wyandotts, U.S.-Wyandotts, Jan. 31, 1855, art. 1, 10 Stat. 1159 (similar).  Admittedly, Felix Cohen 
states that a naturalized Indian “does not lose his [Indian] identity . . . within the meaning of federal 
criminal jurisdictional acts . . . .”  COHEN, supra note 1, Ch. 1, § 2, at 3.  Cohen, however, only cites 
post-ratification authorities for support; thus, it is not clear whether this view of citizenship applied 
at the framing.  See id. Ch. 1, § 2, at 3 n.11.   
 82. GLOBE, supra note 1, at 2895 (statement of Sen. Howard, R-Mich.).  One consensualist 
argument contends that “‘Extent and quality’ denotes contributive responsibilities . . . . of 
commitment, service, and bearing of social costs as is expected of ‘every citizen.’”  Mayton, supra 
note 1, at 246 (quoting GLOBE, supra note 1, at 2895 (statement of Sen. Howard, R-Mich.)).  Yet 
Howard nowhere equates “extent and quality” with such duties; more likely, the phrase simply 
meant that jurisdictional exemptions rendered Indians less subject to U.S. sovereign authority than 
citizens.   
15
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Sen. George Williams took another tack in explaining Indian 
immunities, by analogizing to diplomats’ children.  He noted that if “the 
child of an ambassador” commits a crime, “to a certain extent he is 
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, but not in every respect . . 
. .”83  He then added, “[A]nd so [it is] with these Indians.”84  Although 
such persons, when residing “within a judicial district,” were “in one 
sense . . . subject to the jurisdiction of the court in that district,” they 
were not “in every sense subject to the jurisdiction of the court,” because 
they were not liable to be “brought, by proper process, within the reach 
of the power of the court.”85  Because Indians and diplomatic families 
were immune from federal judicial jurisdiction,86 they were not “fully 
and completely subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.”87  
Hence, jurisdiction requirement excluded them from citizenship.   
Even opponents of the Clause equated “jurisdiction” with aspects of 
“sovereign authority.”  Sen. Hendricks worried that some future 
Congress might “extend our laws over the Indians and compel 
obedience,” such that they were “subject to the jurisdiction of the 
country”88 and therefore entitled to citizenship.  Sen. Johnson claimed 
that Indians would “become citizens by virtue of this amendment,” 
because Congress already had “authority to legislate” over them.89  Sen. 
Doolittle argued that the jurisdiction requirement would not exclude 
Indians because they were partially subject to federal authority via 
 
 83. GLOBE, supra note 1, at 2897 (statement of Sen. Williams, R-Or.).  Williams’ claim that 
an ambassador’s child is “to a certain extent . . . subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, but 
not in every respect” is consistent with the orthodox interpretation.  Id. (emphasis added).  Williams 
also stated that “All persons living within a judicial district may be said, in one sense, to be subject 
to the jurisdiction of the court in that district . . . .”  Id.  This suggests that the italicized text simply 
referred to the child’s residence in the United States.  Alternately, Williams could have meant that 
the child was “punishable” via non-judicial expulsion for violations of American law.  Finally, 
Williams could have been referring to such a child’s obligation to obey the law, despite that child’s 
immunity from judicial process.  See HENRY W. HALLECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW Ch. 9, § 19, at 
218 (New York, D. Van Nostrand 1861) (“For offenses against the laws of the country to which [an 
ambassador] is accredited, the government of that country may not only dismiss the minister and 
send him out of the country, but may demand justice and punishment of his own country . . . .”); id. 
Ch. 9, § 20, at 222 (“[A] minister is held responsible . . . for the conduct of his dependents . . . .”).   
 84. GLOBE, supra note 1, at 2897 (statement of Sen. Williams, R-Or.).   
 85. Id. 
 86. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 929 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “judicial jurisdiction” as 
“[t]he legal power and authority of a court to make a decision that binds the parties to any matter 
properly before it.”); 1 BOUVIER, supra note 1, at 683 (defining “jurisdiction” as “[a] power 
constitutionally conferred upon a judge or magistrate, to take cognizance of, and decide causes 
according to law, and to carry his sentence into execution.”).   
 87. GLOBE, supra note 1, at 2897 (statement of Sen. Williams, R-Or.).   
 88. Id. at 2894 (statement of Sen. Hendricks, D-Ind.).   
 89. Id. at 2893 (statement of Sen. Johnson, D-Md.).   
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“military commanders in the neighborhood of the reservations,” and 
“civil agents who have a control over [Indians] on behalf of the 
Government.”90  The opponents agreed that “jurisdiction” meant 
“sovereign authority”; they only disputed supporters’ contention that 
“subject to the jurisdiction” required subjection to all aspects of 
sovereign power.   
Thus, when defining “jurisdiction,” the framers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment did not shift away from the term’s antebellum meaning.  On 
the contrary, the framers’ (and their opponents’) usage provides further 
evidence that “jurisdiction” originally meant “sovereign authority.”   
B. Original Expected Applications as a “Test Suite” of Original 
Meaning 
Also indicative of original meaning are “original expected 
applications”:  the outcomes the framers expected the Citizenship Clause 
to produce when applied to specific nationality questions.91  Of course, 
expectations alone do not establish that the Clause originally applied to 
illegal aliens’ children, because meaning is not the same as 
expectation,92 and because the framers never discussed such children.93  
Nevertheless, expected applications do provide a valuable “test suite”94 
 
 90. Id. at 2892 (statement of Sen. Doolittle, R-Wis.).   
 91. “Original expected applications” may be defined as “how people living at the time the 
[Constitutional] text was adopted would have expected it would be applied using language in its 
ordinary sense (along with any legal terms of art).”  Balkin, supra note 1, at 296.  Regarding the 
relevance of original expected applications to original meaning, see, for example, id. at 303 
(acknowledging that original expected application “helps us understand the original meaning of the 
text” and “is important . . . as an aid to interpretation . . . .”); John O. McGinnis & Michael 
Rappaport, Original Interpretive Principles as the Core of Originalism, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 371, 
378 (2007) (“[I]t is hard to ascertain what constitutional provisions mean without reference to 
expected applications. . . . [S]ome of the best evidence of that meaning would be the expected 
applications, especially when widely held.”); Solum, supra note 1, at 20 (“Expected applications 
may be evidence about meanings, even if they are not decisive evidence.”).  
 92. See Solum, supra note 1, at 20.   
 93. Admittedly, illegal aliens did have analogues in the mid-nineteenth century, including 
violators of state immigration laws, and “illegal slaves” unlawfully brought into the United States.  
See NEUMAN, supra note 1, at 176-80.  However, “[i]t is not enough to analogize from the [framing-
era] practices that did exist because . . . any two things are both similar to one another and different 
from one another in a countless number of ways.”  Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Originalism and Summary 
Judgement, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 919, 927-28 (2010).   
 94. This phrase refers to an error-checking method used in computer programming.  See 
EUGENE VOLOKH, ACADEMIC LEGAL WRITING:  LAW REVIEW ARTICLES, STUDENT NOTES, 
SEMINAR PAPERS, AND GETTING ON LAW REVIEW 22 (3d ed. 2007) (“A test suite is a set of cases 
that programmers enter into their programs to see whether the results look right.”); id. (“If all the 
test cases yield the correct result, then the programmer can have some confidence that the program 
works.”).   
17
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against which candidate definitions for original meaning may be 
compared.  The logic of such “testing” is simple:  insert a Proposed 
Definition for “jurisdiction” into the Citizenship Clause, and consider 
the outcomes that interpretation would have yielded in the framing era.  
Then compare those outcomes with the original expected applications; if 
the former are inconsistent with the latter, then the Proposed Definition 
is probably not the original meaning of “jurisdiction.”95  Applying this 
methodology to the Citizenship Clause, we find that the orthodox 
interpretation yields outcomes consistent with expected applications, but 
the consensualist interpretation does not.    
1. Original Expected Applications for Aliens, “Illegal Slaves,” 
and “Renegade” Indians  
In the legislative history of the Citizenship Clause, the framers 
expressed or implied several original expected applications.  In addition, 
because the Clause constitutionalized the citizenship provision in the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866,96 we can therefore impute that provision’s 
expected applications to the Clause itself.97  The following discussion 
 
 95. See Greenberg & Litman, supra note 1, at 612-13 (comparing the extrapolation of original 
meaning from expected application to the scientific method of comparing hypotheses with data).   
 96. Act of Apr. 9, 1866, Ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (“[A]ll persons born in the United States and 
not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of 
the United States . . . .”).   
 97. See GLOBE, supra note 1, at 2896 (statement of Sen. Howard, R-Mich.) (“We desired to 
put this question of citizenship . . . beyond the legislative power of [opponents of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1866] . . . .”); id. at 3069 (statement of Rep. Van Aernam, R-N.Y.) (stating that the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s first section as “[g]iv[es] constitutional sanction and protection to the 
substantial guarantees of the civil rights bill . . . .”).  See also CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 2d SESS. 
app. at 82 (statement of Rep. Miller, R-Pa.) (“The first section thereof makes all persons born or 
naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof citizens . . . . This is in effect 
ingrafting the civil rights bill . . . .”).   
  Given these statements, the original meaning of “appropriate legislation,” U.S. CONST. 
amend. XIV, § 5, probably did not authorize statutes inconsistent with the Clause’s original 
meaning because such statutes would vitiate the citizenship guarantee that the Clause sought to 
insulate from legislative repeal.  Arguments that Section 5 authorizes statutory exclusion of illegal 
aliens’ children, Charles, supra note 1 (manuscript at 20 n.118, 42), merely beg the question of 
whether or not the Clause’s original meaning includes such children.   
  Admittedly, Garrett Epps rightly cautions against “assum[ing] that the citizenship 
language in both [the Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act] had identical meanings and 
‘intentions.’”  Epps, supra note 1, at 350 (emphasis added).  This Article does not claim, however, 
that the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment is confined to the meaning of that statute.  
Rather, it merely notes that constitutionalization of the Act was among the original expected 
applications of the Fourteenth Amendment; and that, as such, it is proper to equate the Act’s 
expected applications with the Citizenship Clause’s.   
18
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draws from both of these sources to enumerate the Citizenship Clause’s 
original expected applications.   
The framers expected the Citizenship Clause to apply to native-
born children of non-diplomatic aliens.  Both Sen. John Conness, who 
supported the Clause, and Sen. Edgar Cowan, who opposed it, read the 
Clause in this manner.98  Sen. Trumbull had the same expectation of the 
Civil Rights Act’s citizenship provision; so also did President Andrew 
Johnson, who vetoed that statute.99  In addition, supporters stated that 
each of these provisions merely codified pre-existing citizenship law.100  
Supporters understood that law as granting birthright citizenship to 
aliens’ U.S.-born children.101   
 
 98. See GLOBE, supra note 1, at 2891 (statement of Sen. Cowan, R-Pa.) (interpreting the 
Clause to mean that “everybody who shall be born in the United States shall be taken to be a citizen 
of the United States . . . .”); id. (statement of Sen. Conness, R-Cal.) (“[I]t is proposed [that children 
begotten of Chinese parents in California] shall be citizens.  We have declared that by [the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866]; now it is proposed to incorporate that same provision in the fundamental 
instrument of the nation.  I am in favor of doing so.”).  That no other Senator disagreed with Cowan 
and Conness’ reading suggests that it was generally accepted.  See Wildenthal, supra note 1, at 1588 
(“Lack of dispute, in a deliberative body, in the face of a view clearly and repeatedly articulated 
within that very same body on a plainly important matter, is inherently confirmatory of such a 
view.”).   
 99. Compare GLOBE, supra note 1, at 498 (statement of Sen. Trumbull, R-Ill.) (stating that the 
Civil Rights Act would “[u]ndoubtedly” grant birthright citizenship to U.S.-born children of 
Chinese and Gypsy aliens), with id. at 1679 (stating that the Civil Rights Act “comprehends the 
Chinese of the Pacific States . . . the people called Gypsies, and [black freedmen].  Every individual 
of those races, born in the United States, is by the bill made a citizen of the United States.”).  But 
see EASTMAN, supra note 1, at 2 (“[A]ny child born on U.S. soil to parents who were temporary 
visitors to this country . . . was not entitled to claim the birthright citizenship provided by the 1866 
Act.”).   
 100. Regarding the Citizenship Clause, see, for example, GLOBE, supra note 1, at 2890 
(statement of Sen. Howard, R-Mich.).  Regarding the Civil Rights Act, see id. at 600 (statement of 
Sen. Trumbull, R-Ill.) (“[T]he [Civil Rights Act] now under consideration is but declaratory of what 
the law now is . . . .”); id. at 1115 (statement of Rep. Wilson, R-Iowa) (“This [citizenship] provision 
[of the Civil Rights Act], I maintain, is merely declaratory of what the law now is.”).   
 101. See, e.g., id. at 498 (statement of Sen. Trumbull, R-Ill.) (“[U]nder the naturalization laws, 
children who are born here of parents who have not been naturalized are citizens.”); id. at 1832 
(statement of Rep. Lawrence, R-Ohio) (quoting Lynch v. Clarke, 1 Sand. Ch. 583, 584 (N.Y. Ch. 
1844)) (stating that the Civil Rights Act’s citizenship provision is “only declaratory of what is the 
law,” and observing that “In the great case of Lynch vs. Clarke, it was conclusively shown that . . . 
all ‘children born here are citizens without regard to the political condition or allegiance of their 
parents.’”).  Sen. Cowan argued (incorrectly) that existing law excluded Chinese and Gypsy 
children from birthright citizenship; but even he admitted that “[t]he children of German parents are 
citizens . . . .”  Id. at 498 (statement of Sen. Cowan, R-Pa.).   
  One consensualist argument suggests that Trumbull’s mention of “‘Naturalization laws’ 
probably referred to the 1790 Act . . . and its provision of birthright citizenship to immigrants.”  
Mayton, supra note 1, at 243 n.94 (citation omitted) (quoting GLOBE, supra note 1, at 498 
(statement of Sen. Trumbull, R-Ill.)).  This seems unlikely, however, because antebellum law did 
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The Clause was also expected to naturalize all native-born 
freedmen.102  This included U.S.-born children of the tens of thousands 
who entered the United States as slaves, despite the federal statute 
prohibiting such immigration.103  Although these slaves entered the 
United States involuntarily, Gerald Neuman rightly notes that 
“immigration” may be “[c]onceived broadly as the migration of 
individuals into a state” and “encompasses both voluntary and 
involuntary movement.”104  Hence, because these “illegal slaves” were 
non-citizens whose presence upon American soil violated federal law, 
their native-born children were, effectively, descendants of illegal 
aliens.105  The framers were probably aware that “illegal slaves” 
existed;106 but nobody suggested that illegality of presence excluded the 
children of these slaves from citizenship.   
 
not interpret the naturalization statutes as granting birthright citizenship to U.S.-born children of 
aliens.  See infra Part IV.A.   
 102. See GLOBE, supra note 1, at 497 (emphasis added) (noting Trumbull’s proposal to make 
citizens of “all persons of African descent born in the United States . . . .”); id. at 498 (statement of 
Sen. Trumbull, R-Ill.) (noting that the Civil Rights Act’s citizenship provision had “the same 
purport” as his original proposal); id. at 1679 (emphasis added) (“This [citizenship] provision [of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1866] comprehends . . . the entire race designated as blacks, people of color, 
negroes, mulattoes, and persons of African blood.  Every individual of those races, born in the 
United States, is by the bill made a citizen of the United States.”); CHESTER JAMES ANTIEAU, THE 
INTENDED SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 4-6 (1997) (noting that both supporters 
and opponents expected this).   
 103. See Act of Mar. 2, 1807, Ch. 22, 2 Stat. 426 (banning the importation of slaves).  Several 
sources estimate the quantity of “illegal slave[s]” at “54,000 for 1808-61 . . . .”  PHILIP D. CURTIN, 
THE ATLANTIC SLAVE TRADE:  A CENSUS 74-75 (1969); see also 1 STANLEY L. ENGERMAN & 
ROBERT WILLIAM FOGEL, TIME ON THE CROSS:  THE ECONOMICS OF AMERICAN NEGRO SLAVERY 
25 (1974) (estimating total slave imports at 10,000 per decade - or 50,000 total - between 1810 and 
1860); David Eltis, The U.S. Transatlantic Slave Trade, 1644-1867:  An Assessment, 54 CIV. WAR 
HIST. 347, 353 (concluding that an “estimate of 1,000 a year from 1810 to 1860 based on census 
data is much more likely to reflect reality,” and thus implying that 50,000 “illegal slaves” entered 
during that period).  Admittedly, in the 1870 census, “Colored Population” exceeded “Native 
Colored Population” by only 9,645.  Compare WALKER, supra note 1, at 12 tbl.III (putting 1870 
U.S. “Colored Population” at 4,880,009), with id. at 388 tbl.XIII (putting 1870 U.S. “Native 
Colored Population” at 4,870,364).  Yet as Warren Howard observes, illegally-imported slaves did 
have an incentive to “conceal their origin,” because “the Fourteenth Amendment gives federally 
protected citizenship rights to ‘all persons born or naturalized in the United States,’ but not to illegal 
immigrants smuggled in by stealth.”  WARREN S. HOWARD, AMERICAN SLAVERS AND THE 
FEDERAL LAW 303 n.22 (1963) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 1).   
 104. NEUMAN, supra note 1, at 39.   
 105. See 37 ANNALS OF CONG. 557 (1820) (statement of Rep. Smyth) (“Slaves are aliens.  
Alienage was the first foundation of slavery.”); 7 Op. Att’y Gen. 746, 749 (1856) (“[A] slave, it is 
clear, cannot be a citizen.”); NEUMAN, supra note 1, at 177 (“[The] central connotation [of ‘illegal 
alien’] is an alien whose presence in this country involves a violation of the law that has not been 
cured.”).   
 106. This was likely, given the antebellum slave trade’s notoriety.  Lincoln’s first inaugural 
address characterized “[t]he foreign slave trade” as “imperfectly suppressed . . . .”  ABRAHAM 
20
Akron Law Review, Vol. 45 [2012], Iss. 3, Art. 6
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol45/iss3/6
12- ING_MACRO.DOCM 7/12/2012  3:41 PM 
2012] CITIZENSHIP CLAUSE 739 
The framers did not expect, however, that the Clause would apply 
to children of diplomats.  Senator Howard explicitly stated that the 
Clause “will not, of course, include persons born in the United States . . . 
who belong to the families of ambassadors . . . .”107  Senators Trumbull 
and Williams expressed similar sentiments.108  Moreover, when 
supporters stated that the Clause codified existing law, they necessarily 
implied the exclusion of diplomats’ children because that exclusion was 
a well-known feature of antebellum law.109  
Nor was the Clause deemed applicable to children of “renegade” 
Indians who belonged to no tribe.110  Because the framers knew of these 
Indians and opposed birthright citizenship for their children, when 
drafting the Civil Rights Act the framers rejected language that only 
excluded Indians belonging to a tribe.111  Instead, they employed 
 
LINCOLN, FIRST INAUGURAL ADDRESS - FINAL TEXT (1861), reprinted in 4 THE COLLECTED 
WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 262, 269 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).  See also W.E.B. DU BOIS, THE 
SUPPRESSION OF THE AFRICAN SLAVE-TRADE TO THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1638-1870, at 
115-20, 126-29, 159-61, 178-83 (New York, Longmans, Green, & Co. 1896) (discussing the 
inadequacy of federal enforcement efforts and the continuation of slave smuggling through the 
1850s).   
 107. See GLOBE, supra note 1, at 2890 (statement of Sen. Howard, R-Mich.).  Regarding 
consensualist attempts to misread this statement as applying to non-diplomatic aliens, see infra Part 
IV.B.2.   
 108. See GLOBE, supra note 1, at 2897 (statement of Sen. Williams, R-Or.) (noting that “the 
child of an ambassador” was “subject to the jurisdiction of the United States” only “to a certain 
extent . . . but not in every respect.”); id. at 572 (statement of Sen. Trumbull, R-Ill.) (“We cannot 
make a citizen of the child of a foreign minister who is temporarily residing here.”).   
 109. See, e.g., Inglis v. Trustees of Sailor’s Snug Harbor, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 99, 155 (1830) 
(Story, J., dissenting); Lynch v. Clarke, 1 Sand. Ch. 583, 658 (N.Y. Ch. 1844); GLOBE, supra note 
1, at 2769 (statement of Sen. Wade, R-Ohio) (“[A] person may be born here and not a citizen.  I 
know that is so . . . in the case of the children of foreign ministers . . . .”).   
 110. See Williams, supra note 1, at 834 (employing this label to refer to Indians who lacked 
tribal ties and were exempt to federal jurisdiction).    
 111. Compare GLOBE, supra note 1, at 526 (statement of Sen. Conness, R-Cal.) (complaining 
that, although some Indians on California reservations had “no capacity for citizenship,” they would 
not be excluded by language regarding “tribal authority,” because they were “not under the direction 
of any tribal authority whatever.”), id. at 572 (statement of Sen. Trumbull, R-Ill.) (opposing 
citizenship for “Indians not subject to tribal authority . . . of whom the authorities of the United 
States took no jurisdiction.”), id. at 572 (statement of Sen. Doolittle, R-Wis.) (“Although some of 
these Indians may be disconnected from their tribes, and may be wandering in bands and in families 
. . . I do not think they are yet in a condition to be . . . citizens of the United States . . . .”), id. at 573 
(statement of Sen. Williams, R-Or.) (“[T]hese Indians . . . are collected upon reservations; they are 
not subject to tribal authority . . . but they are no more competent or qualified to vote than they were 
when they existed as original tribes.”), id. at 574 (statement of Sen. Ramsey, R-Minn.) (opposing 
citizenship for “large bodies of Indians not subject to tribal authority . . . .”), and id. at 574 
(statement of Sen. Lane, R-Kan.) (opposing citizenship for “the very lowest class of Indians, the 
vagrant Indians who have separated themselves from their tribal authority.”), with id. at 504 
(statement of Sen. Lane, R-Kan.) (proposing a citizenship provision which read, “All persons born 
in the United States, and not subject to any foreign Power or tribal authority, are hereby declared to 
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terminology that encompassed all Indians—tribal and “renegade”—not 
subject to federal sovereign authority.112  Although “renegade” Indians 
were never explicitly discussed during the Citizenship Clause debates, 
several Senators who strongly opposed their citizenship were present for 
those debates.  Yet, not only were these opponents unconcerned that the 
Clause might encompass “renegade” Indians; they also rejected as 
redundant the proposal to explicitly exempt “Indians not taxed” from the 
Clause.113  Thus, it appears the framers expected the jurisdiction 
requirement to exclude “renegade” Indians from birthright citizenship.114   
2. Expected Applications and Original Meaning 
Having established the Citizenship Clause’s various original 
expected applications, we now consider whether they are more 
consistent with the outcomes arising from the orthodox interpretation, or 
with those produced by the consensualist interpretation.   
 
be citizens of the United States . . . .” ), id. at 526 (statement of Sen. Pomeroy, R-Kan.) (“I move to 
insert the words ‘tribal authority’ after the word ‘Power.’”), id. at 572 (statement of Sen. Henderson, 
R-Mo.) (proposing the exclusion of Indians “not owing allegiance to any tribe.”), and id. at 574 
(statement of Sen. Henderson, R-Mo.) (“I move to amend [the citizenship provision of the Civil 
Rights Act] by striking out the words ‘not taxed’ and inserting the words ‘not subject to tribal 
authority.’”).   
 112. After Trumbull added “excluding Indians not taxed” to the Civil Rights Act’s citizenship 
provision, Conness stated, “That will do,” and Ramsey noted that this had “overcome” his concerns 
about “renegade” Indians.  Id. at 527 (statement of Sen. Trumbull, R-Ill.); id. (statement of Sen. 
Conness, R-Cal.); id. at 571 (statement of Sen. Ramsey, R-Minn.).  Trumbull noted that 
Constitution used “Indians not taxed” to refer to “Indians who do not recognize the government of 
the United States at all, who are not subject to our laws . . . whom we do not pretend to . . . punish 
for the commission of crimes one upon the other . . . .”  Id. at 527 (statement of Sen. Trumbull, R-
Ill.).   
 113. Compare id. at 2897 (listing Senators Conness, Lane, Ramsey, Trumbull, and Williams as 
voting against Doolittle’s proposed “excluding Indians not taxed” amendment), with id. at 526 
(statement of Sen. Conness, R-Cal.) (opposing “renegade” Indians’ citizenship), id. at 572 
(statement of Sen. Trumbull, R-Ill.) (similar), id. at 573 (statement of Sen. Williams, R-Or.) 
(similar), id. at 574 (statement of Sen. Lane, R-Kan.) (similar), and id. at 574 (statement of Sen. 
Ramsey, R-Minn.) (similar).   
 114. See Williams, supra note 1, at 836 n.256 (noting that “[n]o-one mentioned the fear that 
nontribal ‘renegade’ Indians might become citizens under the amendment,” because “the fourteenth 
amendment excluded all those not subject to the United States, and the renegades were presumably 
subject to U.S. jurisdiction no more than tribal Indians.”).   
  Admittedly, one scholar does suggest that, under the Citizenship Clause, “members of 
Tribes were not citizens but . . . individual Native Americans who were not members of Tribes 
would be considered citizens.”  Magliocca, supra note 1, at 520-21 (emphasis added); see also Elk 
v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 112 (1884) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“[T]he [Civil Rights] act of 1866 
reached Indians not in tribal relations.”).  This suggestion, however, overlooks the controversy that 
“renegade” Indians provoked during the Civil Rights Act debates, as well as the framers’ 
understanding that both Act and Clause would exclude such Indians from citizenship.  See GLOBE, 
supra note 1, at 526-27, 572-74.   
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Under the orthodox interpretation, “jurisdiction” originally meant 
“sovereign power”; thus, in determining the outcomes associated with 
that interpretation, we must determine the extent of framing-era federal 
authority over the various aforementioned categories.  In antebellum 
law, children of non-diplomatic aliens were subject to the sovereign 
power of the federal government.115  The same was true of slaves, both 
native- and foreign-born.116  On the other hand, long-standing federal 
law exempted diplomats’ families from federal and state jurisdiction.117  
Similarly, Indian immunities applied to children of tribal and “renegade” 
Indians alike because Indian status was based on parentage, not tribal 
membership.118  Hence, in the framing era, federal sovereign power 
applied to persons whom the Citizenship Clause was originally expected 
to encompass, and those exempt from the Clause’s operation were 
substantially immune from federal authority.  It follows that the 
outcomes associated with the orthodox interpretation are consistent with 
the expected applications of the Citizenship Clause.   
The same cannot be said, however, of the consensualist 
interpretation.  Under that interpretation, children of both non-diplomatic 
aliens and “illegal slaves” would have been excluded because both 
categories of alien parents lacked “undivided allegiance” to the United 
 
 115. For example, in 1830 Joseph Story noted that “the children even of aliens born in a 
country while the parents are resident there . . . are [citizens] by birth.”  Inglis v. Trustees of Sailor’s 
Snug Harbor, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 99, 164 (1830) (Story, J., dissenting).  He also stated birthright 
citizenship required a person to be “born within a place where the sovereign is at the time in full 
possession and exercise of his power . . . .”  Id. at 155.  It follows that Story considered aliens’ 
native-born children to be subject to American sovereign authority at birth.  So also did Sen. 
Trumbull in 1866.  Compare GLOBE, supra note 1, at 498 (statement of Sen. Trumbull, R-Ill.) 
(“[C]hildren who are born here of parents who have not been naturalized are citizens.”), with id. at 
527 (“[P]ersons born in the United States and under its authority . . . are citizens . . . .”).   
 116. See Act of Sept. 18, 1850, Ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462 (authorizing federal assistance in capturing 
fugitive slaves); United States v. Amy, 24 F. Cas. 792, 810 (C.C.D. Va. 1859) (No. 14,445) (“As a 
person, [a slave] is bound to obey the law, and may, like any other person, be punished if he offends 
against it; and he may be embraced in the provisions of the law, either by the description of property 
or as a person, according to the subject-matter upon which congress [sic] or a state is legislating.”); 
2 Op. Att’y Gen. 693, 695 (1834) (noting that federal jurisdiction covered crimes committed in 
Indian country by a non-Indian’s slave).   
 117. See 5 Op. Att’y. Gen. 69, 70 (1849) (“The laws of the United States . . . vindicate the 
principles of the extra-territoriality of the minister, his family, and other persons attached to the 
legation, securing to their persons and personal effects perfect immunity from arrest, seizure, or 
violence . . . .”).   
 118. See United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567, 573 (1846) (“[T]he exception 
[excluding intra-Indian crimes from federal jurisdiction] is confined to those who by the usages and 
customs of the Indians are regarded as belonging to their race.  It does not speak of members of a 
tribe, but of the race generally—of the family of Indians . . . .”); United States v. Sanders, 27 F. Cas. 
950, 951 (C.C.D. Ark. 1847) (No. 16,220) (defining Indian status using a rule of matrilineal 
descent); People v. Dean, 14 Mich. 406, 433 (1866) (defining Indian status via patrilineal descent).   
23
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States.119  Moreover, as Gerald Neuman rightly notes, “[i]f . . . consent 
does not extend to the children of parents not lawfully admitted to the 
United States, then the fourteenth amendment did not constitutionally 
mandate American citizenship for the children of illegally imported 
slaves.”120  On the other hand, “renegade” Indians lacking any tribal 
allegiance would have owed “undivided allegiance” to the United 
States.121  Because no federal law excluded these Indians from American 
soil, their children would have received birthright citizenship under the 
consensualist interpretation.122  The only expectation that consensualism 
can account for is the exclusion of diplomats’ children.123   
 
 119. Although some consensualists suggest that the Citizenship Clause applies to children of 
legal aliens, SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 1, at 78, they do not explain how alien parents with a 
foreign allegiance fulfill the “undivided allegiance” requirement.  Others consensualists concede 
that “U.S.-born children of legally resident aliens are not citizens at birth [under the consensualist 
interpretation].”  Sutherland, supra note 1.   
 120. See NEUMAN, supra note 1, at 179.   Although a consensualist might argue that “illegally 
imported slaves . . . constituted a de minimus exception to the mutual consent principle that cannot 
be applied to the much greater number of illegal immigrants arriving now,” Magliocca, supra note 
1, at 514, this objection erroneously conflates “the expected application of constitutional texts, 
which is not binding law, and the original meaning, which is.”  Balkin, supra note 1, at 293.  If 
“jurisdiction” originally meant “sovereign authority,” and the framers decided to use “jurisdiction” 
because they expected future illegal immigration to remain low, this original meaning would remain 
the same even if the framers' expectations about future illegal immigration proved mistaken.   
 121. Admittedly, a consensualist might respond that, because the consensualist interpretation 
also requires subjection to sovereign power, SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 1, at 86, the 
jurisdictional exemptions of federal Indian law would exclude “renegade” Indians under a 
consensualist Citizenship Clause.  As noted above, however, consensualists usually exclude Indians 
on the basis of their tribal allegiances, and overlook the alternative explanation provided by federal 
Indian law.  See id. at 79-86.  It thus seems fair to neglect Indian immunities when applying 
consensulism to “renegade” Indians.   
  Nor can consensualists cite Goodell v. Jackson ex dem. Smith, 20 Johns. 693, 710 (N.Y. 
1823) (Kent, C.J.) and Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 583 (1832) (McLean, J., 
concurring), to argue that “renegade” Indians lacked allegiance to the United States because these 
opinions concerned only tribal Indians.  Admittedly, as with diplomats, “renegade” Indians’ 
absence of allegiance can be attributed to their immunities under federal law.  Cf. Schooner Exch. v. 
McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 139 (1812) (noting that diplomatic immunity eliminates the 
temporary allegiance a foreign ambassador would otherwise owe to a receiving state).  But if 
consensualists are going to overlook Indian immunities, they must also ignore the lack of allegiance 
resulting from those immunities.   
 122. If, alternately, naturalization statutes—and not immigration laws—were deemed 
conclusive evidence of consent, then the 1802 Naturalization Act’s limitation to “free white 
person[s]” would have excluded “renegade” Indians.  Act of Apr. 14, 1802, Ch. 28, § 1, 2 Stat. 153; 
see also 2 KENT, supra note 1, at *72 (doubting whether the naturalization laws encompassed “the 
copper-colored natives of America . . . .”).  This approach, however, would also have denied 
citizenship to native-born freedmen, because the statute “exclude[d] the inhabitants of Africa, and 
their descendants . . . .”  2 KENT, supra note 1, at *72.   
 123. See SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 1, at 85 (“Diplomatic families, owing allegiance to their 
home countries, bore an attachment to the United States . . . even less extensive than that borne by 
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Thus, the Citizenship Clause’s original expected applications are 
entirely consistent with the orthodox interpretation, but they are largely 
incompatible with the consensualist alternative.  This result suggests that 
the orthodox interpretation is indeed correct,124 and that “jurisdiction” 
originally meant “sovereign power.”  It also suggests that the 
consensualist interpretation is wrong as a matter of original meaning.   
C. The Citizenship Clause During Ratification 
The ratification debates surrounding the Fourteenth Amendment 
basically recapitulated its legislative history, at least as far as the 
Citizenship Clause was concerned.  Thus, although the Clause drew 
relatively little attention during the ratification process,125 what evidence 
does exist supports the orthodox interpretation.   
First, between the Fourteenth Amendment’s drafting in 1866 and its 
ratification in 1868, both federal and state courts continued to read 
“jurisdiction” as meaning “sovereign authority” alone.126  Given the 
orthodox interpretation’s continued dominance in legal circles, it seems 
likely that this definition also prevailed among the ratifying public when 
they were considering the Citizenship Clause.  Second, the public did 
not expect the Clause to abolish birthright citizenship.  Supporters noted 
that the Clause would grant citizenship to those who were “native-
born”127 or “born here [in the United States] . . . .”128  Opponents evinced 
 
Indians . . . . Moreover, this privileged status of diplomats was one to which both governments 
consented . . . .”).   
 124. This is not to say, of course, that complete consistency with expected applications is a sine 
qua non of original meaning; as Greenberg and Litman rightly note, “it is always possible that, for a 
given set of practices, there is no rule that is both fully consistent and principled.”  Greenberg & 
Litman, supra note 1, at 614.  Yet even they agree that a term’s original meaning should be 
consistent with “most” expected applications.  Id. at 615.   
 125. See BOND, supra note 1, at 8 (“[T]he debates did not focus primarily on Section 1 . . . .”).   
 126. See In re Kyler, 14 F. Cas. 887 (S.D.N.Y. 1868) (No. 7,956); In re Reynolds, 20 F. Cas. 
592, 609 (N.D.N.Y. 1867) (No. 11,721); Stone v. Brooks, 35 Cal. 489, 494 (1868); Steele v. Steele, 
35 Conn. 48, 55 (1868); Stephenson v. Davis, 56 Me. 73, 75 (1868); Smith v. Mut. Life Ins. Co. of 
N.Y., 96 Mass. 336, 342 (1867); Gemmell v. Rice, 13 Minn. 400, 403 (1868); Guernsey v. Am. Ins. 
Co., 13 Minn. 278, 286 (1868) (Wilson, C. J., dissenting); City of St. Louis v. Wiggins Ferry Co., 
40 Mo. 580, 587 (1867); Shann v. Jones, 19 N.J. Eq. 251, 252 (N.J. Ch. 1868); State v. Rankin, 44 
Tenn. 145, 147 (1867); Martin v. Crow, 28 Tex. 613, 616 (1866).   
 127. American Citizenship, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 10, 1866, at 2 (emphasis added) (noting that the 
Citizenship Clause “declares that . . . a citizen, native-born or naturalized, of the United States, shall 
also be a citizen of the state wherein he resides.”).  See also Massachusetts, The Constitutional 
Amendment-The Legislative Committee Divided Upon the Question of Adoption-The Minority and 
Majority Reports-The Colored Member, Mr. Walker, Against Adoption, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1867, 
at 5 (“It is already well established law . . . that all native-born inhabitants . . . without distinction of 
color or sex, are citizens of the United States. . . . [I]f this matter should come before the present 
25
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the same expectation.129  In addition, when ratification of the Fourteenth 
Amendment was ongoing, Congressional debates regarding the 
Expatriation Act of 1868130 assumed that birthright citizenship would 
continue to exist.131   
Third, the Clause’s expected application to aliens’ native-born 
children was effectively conveyed to the ratifying public.  When Sen. 
Conness expressed this expectation during Senate debate, his statement 
 
Supreme Court as a new question under this amendment, there would be no danger of an adverse 
decision.”); The Constitutional Amendment, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 14, 1866, at 2 (“The amendment 
declares that all persons born in the United States . . . shall be citizens of the United States . . . .”); 
The Objections to the Amendment, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 16, 1866, at 2 (emphasis added) (noting that 
opponents “object to the first clause by saying that to make all men born in the United States 
citizens, is to place all men upon a political equality.  The Clause in the proposed Amendment does 
not make all men politically equal.  It makes them equal in all civil and legal rights pertaining to 
citizenship.”).   
 128. Senator Trumbull In Chicago, in CAMPAIGN SPEECHES, supra note 1, at 6, col. 3 (noting 
that, under the Clause, “[A]ll who were born here . . . were to be deemed citizens of the United 
States . . . .”).  See also In the Opera House, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 2, 1866, at 4 (similar); Nomination of 
Ashley in the Tenth District, in CAMPAIGN SPEECHES, supra note 1, at 19, col. 1 (similar); Speech of 
Governor Morton, in CAMPAIGN SPEECHES, supra note 1, at 35, col. 3 (similar); Speech of Hon. 
Columbus Delano, at Coshocton, Ohio, August 28, in CAMPAIGN SPEECHES, supra note 1, at 23, 
col. 3 (similar); Speech of Hon. Schuyler Colfax, at Indianapolis, August 7, in CAMPAIGN 
SPEECHES, supra note 1, at 14, col. 5 (similar); The Reconstruction Scheme of Congress Passed 
Over to the States, N.Y. HERALD, June 15, 1866, at 4 (similar).   
 129. See Speech of C.L. Vallandigham, in CAMPAIGN SPEECHES, supra note 1, at 42, col. 5 
(“[B]y this amendment it is proposed that all persons shall be citizens, not only of the United States, 
but of the State in which they reside.”); The Hon. Geo. H. Pendleton’s Speech, in CAMPAIGN 
SPEECHES, supra note 1, at 4, col. 3 (similar).   
 130. Act of July 27, 1868, Ch. 249, 15 Stat. 223.   
 131. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 40TH CONG., 2d SESS. 869 (1868) (statement of Rep. Pile) 
(expressing support for “a specific assertion of that doctrine [of expatriation] as applied to persons 
born within the jurisdiction of the United States.”); id. at 986 (statement of Rep. Judd) (criticizing 
language granting “naturalized citizens” a lesser degree of governmental protection abroad than “the 
native-born citizen”); id. at 1018 (statement of Rep. Woodward) (“By naturalization the foreigner 
becomes an American citizen . . . as truly as if he was ‘native to the manor born.’”); id. at 1102 
(statement of Rep. Ashley) (“[P]rotection is due from this government to every citizen foreign born 
as well as native-born.”); id. at 1105 (statement of Rep. Clarke) (“[O]ur laws know no distinction 
between the rights of a native-born and naturalized citizen . . . .”); id. at 1156-57 (statement of Rep. 
Jenckes) (“I do not admit that there is any difference in the quality of citizenship once acquired, 
whether it be by birth within the jurisdiction of the United States or by the naturalization of persons 
born in any other part of the earth.”); id. at 1804 (statement of Rep. Van Trump) (emphasis added) 
(“A government has the right to say who, other than those who are native-born, shall become its 
citizens . . . .”); id. at 4211 (statement of Sen. Howard) (emphasis added) (noting “the duty of the 
Government to see to it that [a naturalized citizen] is as well protected . . . as a citizen of the United 
States as if he were born in this country.”); id. at 4353 (statement of Sen. Yates) (emphasis added) 
(“[W]herever the American flag floats, there will float protection to the American citizen . . . 
whether he be born in this country or any other land.”); id. at 4355 (statement of Sen. Howard) 
(emphasis added) (“[T]he provision most likely to work out the vindication everywhere of 
American citizens, be they home born or adopted . . . will be adopted.”).   
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was widely publicized throughout the nation.132  Similarly, Ohio 
Republican Rep. Benjamin Eggleston noted that, under the Clause, 
“children born here of parents coming to our shores from Germany, 
Ireland, and other countries, [would] never be denied the . . . character of 
citizens . . . .”133  Another Fourteenth Amendment supporter implicitly 
admitted that the Clause would grant birthright citizenship to children of 
Gypsy aliens, when he noted that Gypsies’ pro-Union sentiment made 
their children worthy of citizenship.134  Moreover, in both northern and 
southern states, Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment was viewed as 
constitutionalizing the Civil Rights Act.135  This is significant because 
the public was well aware that the Act extended citizenship to aliens’ 
U.S.-born children.136 
 
 132. See, e.g., Congressional, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, May 31, 1866, at 1 (“Mr. CONNESS 
(Cal.) spoke in favor of Mr. Howard’s Amendment.  The progeny of [Chinese immigrants] in 
California was very small in number, and the proposed amendment would but very slightly affect 
the citizenship of California.”); Thirty-Ninth Congress, DAILY AGE, May 31, 1866, at 1 (similar); 
Thirty-Ninth Congress, DAILY NAT’L INTELLIGENCER, May 31, 1866, at 2 (similar); Thirty-Ninth 
Congress, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 1866, at 1 (similar); Thirty-Ninth Congress, N.Y. HERALD, May 31, 
1866, at 1 (similar); Thirty-Ninth Congress, N. AM. & U.S. GAZETTE, May 31, 1866, at 1 (similar); 
XXXIXth Congress, N.Y. TRIB., May 31, 1866, at 1 (similar); XXXIXth Congress-First Session, 
PUB. LEDGER, May 31, 1866, at 1 (similar).  See also Senator Conness on Reconstruction, 
SACRAMENTO DAILY UNION, July 25, 1866, at 2.   
 133. Speech of the Hon. Benjamin Eggleston, in CAMPAIGN SPEECHES, supra note 1, at 37, col. 
3.   
 134. Madison, Letter to the Editor, The National Question. The Constitutional Amendments - 
National Citizenship, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1866, at 1.   
 135. See BOND, supra note 1, at 56-58 (North Carolina); id. at 80 (Louisiana); id. at 105 
(Alabama); id. at 123-24 (South Carolina); id. at 148-49 (Virginia); id. at 234 (Georgia); HORACE E. 
FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 153 (1908) (“[T]he general opinion held 
in the North. . . . was that the Amendment embodied the Civil Rights Bill . . . .”); id. at 149 
(Indiana); id. at 149 n.35 (New York); GEORGE W. PASCHAL, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES DEFINED AND CAREFULLY ANNOTATED ¶ 279, at 290 (Washington, W.H. & O.H. Morrison 
1868) (Amendment’s first section “[d]efines national citizenship, and thus makes organic what had 
already been declared law by the first section of the Civil Rights Bill.”); Speech of Hon. John 
Sherman, in CAMPAIGN SPEECHES, supra note 1, at 39, col. 3 (similar).   
 136. See Bose’s Resolutions, SACRAMENTO DAILY UNION, Jan. 11, 1868, at 2 (“By the 
common law all persons born in the country and not subject to a foreign Power are citizens.  This 
was affirmed by William L. Marcy to be the American law . . . . Attorney General Bates was of this 
opinion.  So were all the best lawyers in Congress when the Civil Rights bill was passed . . . . That 
Act simply declared the law on this point.”); Citizenship, SACRAMENTO DAILY UNION, Jan. 18, 
1868, at 2 (“[Great Britain] claims as citizens all children born in that country even though of 
foreign parents.  Our law is the same as to the citizenship of native-born persons.  It attaches to them 
at birth, without regard to race or color . . . . The Civil Rights bill was merely declaratory of this 
fact. . . . It merely states the old and recognized law regarding citizenship . . . .”); Senator Conness 
on Reconstruction, SACRAMENTO DAILY UNION, July 25, 1866, at 2 (Act grants birthright 
citizenship to native-born children of Chinese aliens); The Civil Rights Bill, DAILY ALTA CAL., Mar. 
15, 1866, at 2 (similar); The Civil Rights Bill, SACRAMENTO DAILY UNION, Mar. 29, 1866, at 2 
(similar).   
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Even in California,137 where Chinese immigration had long aroused 
opposition, Fourteenth Amendment supporters affirmed that the 
Citizenship Clause would apply to Chinese immigrants’ native-born 
children.138  Sen. Conness explicitly stated that, under the Citizenship 
Clause, “children begotten of Chinese parents in California . . . shall be 
citizens.”139  Other Californian supporters affirmed that the Clause 
applied to native-born children of all races,140 but did not address 
birthright citizenship for Chinese specifically.  Yet even these supporters 
implicitly echoed Conness when they argued that only foreign-born 
Chinese would be denied citizenship, or that explicit disfranchisement—
not denials of birthright citizenship—would exclude Chinese from 
voting.141   
 
 137. Although California did not ratify the Amendment until 1959, its 1866-1868 ratification 
debate remains valuable because it illustrates how the ratifying public understood the Clause’s 
original meaning and expected applications.   
 138. Indeed, they clung to the orthodox interpretation even at the cost of their political careers.  
See Robert Denning, A Fragile Machine:  California Senator John Conness, CAL. HIST., Sept. 
2008, at 26, 44 (emphasis added) (“The Fourteenth Amendment was one of the most controversial 
Reconstruction acts among Californians because it threatened to grant rights to Chinese immigrants 
that the state had denied to them for almost two decades:  citizenship, due process, equal 
opportunity, and possibly suffrage.”); id. at 45 (noting that, in 1867, “the Democratic Party ended its 
political exile and retook the state legislature on a platform opposing Chinese citizenship and civil 
rights.”).  As Michael Ramsey has noted, these kinds of admissions against interest provide 
“important evidence” of original meaning.  See Michael D. Ramsey, Missouri v. Holland and 
Historical Textualism, 73 MO. L. REV. 969, 989 (2008).   
 139. Senator Conness on Reconstruction, SACRAMENTO DAILY UNION, July 25, 1866, at 2.     
 140. See, e.g., Democratic Fairness, SACRAMENTO DAILY UNION, Mar. 24, 1868, at 2 
(“[E]very man, woman and child may be a citizen by natural birthright in any country . . . . 
Moreover, this provision of the amendment is already the law of the land by the Civil Rights Act . . . 
. Nor was it less the law before the Civil Rights Act was passed; for it has always been the doctrine 
of our statesmen . . . that all free persons born in the country are citizens . . . . The Civil Rights Act 
is simply declaratory of that proposition, and the proposed amendment only places it in the 
Constitution . . . .”); Suffrage and Citizenship, SACRAMENTO DAILY UNION, Aug. 22, 1867, at 2 
(emphasis added) (“Section 1 will . . . make ‘citizens’ . . . of the two classes referred to - all persons 
born in the United States, regardless of their color, and all persons naturalized - the ‘white’ 
complexion being an indispensible requisite under the law.”).   
 141. See Democratic Fairness, SACRAMENTO DAILY UNION, Mar. 24, 1868, at 2 (parrying 
opponents’ “cry of negro and Chinese suffrage” by noting that “suffrage is a privilege always 
limited by statute law.”); Suffrage and Citizenship, SACRAMENTO DAILY UNION, Aug. 22, 1867, at 
2 (asserting that, because “Chinese cannot be naturalized,” the Fourteenth Amendment “would 
therefore leave our Chinese population precisely where they are at present - ‘persons’ but not 
‘citizens’ . . . .”).  The latter editorial’s reference to naturalization laws suggests that, by “Chinese,” 
the editorial was apparently referring only to foreign-born Chinese, not their native-born children 
(who were born citizens under the Amendment, and not in need of naturalization).  It seems unlikely 
that supporters would, on the one hand, speak of granting birthright citizenship “regardless of their 
color,” id., while simultaneously excluding a particular group—Chinese immigrants and their 
children—on the basis of “color.”  Id.  Indeed, by contending that Chinese were “persons” within 
28
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Admittedly, reliance upon the Fourteenth Amendment ratification 
debates is potentially problematic because the record of these debates is 
incomplete.142  That said, insofar as these debates address the 
Citizenship Clause, they are consistent with the thesis that “jurisdiction” 
originally meant “sovereign authority.”   
D. The Citizenship Clause After Ratification 
Further support for the orthodox interpretation of “jurisdiction” can 
be found in post-ratification authorities that discussed the Citizenship 
Clause.  First, many legal commentators accepted the orthodox 
interpretation, even though it foreclosed their preferred rule of jus 
sanguinis.143  Second, executive branch officials routinely affirmed 
birthright citizenship for aliens’ native-born children.144  Third, when 
 
the meaning of the Amendment’s apportionment provision, the editorial implicitly acknowledged 
that “persons” in the Clause was likewise race-neutral.  Id.   
  Although the editorial may have been assuming that native-born Chinese were not citizens 
at birth, this seems improbable, because antebellum law did not exclude Chinese from birthright 
citizenship.  When Chancellor Kent doubted whether “the Asiatics” could be deemed “‘white 
persons’ within the purview of the law,” he was not referring to birthright citizenship, but rather to 
the naturalization statutes.  2 KENT, supra note 1, at *72 (alteration in original) (quoting Act of Apr. 
14, 1802, Ch. 28, § 1, 2 Stat. 153).  The disparagement of Chinese citizenship in People v. Hall, 4 
Cal. 399, 404-405 (1854), was “pure dictum . . . .”  Charles J. McClain, Jr., The Chinese Struggle 
for Civil Rights in Nineteenth Century America:  The First Phase, 1850-1870, 72 CAL. L. REV. 529, 
538 n.46 (1984).  But see Jonathan C. Drimmer, The Nephews of Uncle Sam:  The History, 
Evolution, and Application of Birthright Citizenship in the United States, 9 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 667, 
687-89 (1995) (arguing that antebellum law denied birthright citizenship to Asian-Americans).   
 142. See BOND, supra note 1, at 8 (absence of state-level legislative journals necessitates 
reliance upon “newspaper and other accounts” that are sometimes “lost” and “fragmentary,” and 
that “may not accurately reflect the range of views . . . .”).   
 143. 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW *49 n.1 (O. W. Holmes, Jr. ed., 
Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 12th ed. 1873) (deeming “nationality of the parent” the “true” 
criterion of birthright citizenship, and calling the Citizenship Clause “objectionable” for not 
adopting such a test); Editorial, 5 AM. L. REV. 780 (1871) (expressing sympathy for “making 
parentage and not place the test of nationality by birth,” but concluding that the Citizenship Clause 
“makes the place of birth alone determine the duties of citizenship.”); Thomas P. Stoney, 
Citizenship, 34 AM. L. REG. 1, 3 (1886) (“The word jurisdiction means authority, power, potential 
authority, actual power.”); Marshall B. Woodworth, Citizenship of the United States Under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 30 AM. L. REV. 535, 543 (1896) (“Persons born in this country of alien 
parents . . . are certainly subject to the jurisdiction of the United States; they are subject to its laws 
and regulations.”).   
 144. See, e.g., Letter from Alvey A. Adee, Acting Sec’y of State, U.S., to Bartlett Tripp, 
Ambassador to Austria, U.S. (July 23, 1895), in U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE 
UNITED STATES 22, 22 (Washington, D.C., Gov’t Printing Office 1896); Letter from James O. 
Broadhead, Ambassador to Switz., U.S., to W.Q. Gresham, Sec’y of State, U.S. (Aug. 16, 1893), in 
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 656, 661 (Washington, D.C., 
Gov’t Printing Office 1895); Letter from William M. Evarts, Sec’y of State, U.S., to Michael J. 
Cramer, Ambassador to Denmark, U.S. (Nov. 12, 1880), in 2 WHARTON, supra note 1, § 183, at 
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judges interpreted the Clause, they generally equated “jurisdiction” with 
“sovereign authority.”145  Fourth, dictionaries of the time continued to 
define “jurisdiction” conventionally.146   
The Supreme Court likewise embraced the orthodox interpretation.  
Elk v. Wilkins147 endorsed birthright citizenship generally,148 but 
excluded Indians from the privilege.  Explaining this exclusion, the 
Court noted that Indians were not subject to taxation or ordinary federal 
laws.149  Thus, “Indians born within the territorial limits of the United 
States” did not meet the jurisdiction requirement because they were no 
more “subject to [U.S.] political jurisdiction” than “the children of 
subjects of any foreign government born within the domain of that 
 
397; Letter from William M. Evarts, Sec’y of State, U.S., to Edward F. Noyes, Ambassador to Fr., 
U.S. (Dec. 31, 1878), in 2 WHARTON, supra note 1, § 183, at 396, 397; Fish, supra note 1, at 1192; 
Letter from Hamilton Fish, Sec’y of State, U.S., to Charles Lederer, Minister to the U.S., Austria 
(Dec. 24, 1872), in 2 WHARTON, supra note 1, § 183, at 395; Letter from Hamilton Fish, Sec’y of 
State, U.S., to George P. Marsh, Ambassador to Italy, U.S. (May 19, 1871), in 2 WHARTON, supra 
note 1, § 183, at 394; Letter from W.Q. Gresham, Sec’y of State, U.S., to James O. Broadhead, 
Ambassador to Switz., U.S. (Sept. 6, 1893), in U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE 
UNITED STATES 667, 667 (Washington, D.C., Gov’t Printing Office 1895); Letter from W.Q. 
Gresham, Sec’y of State, U.S., to Theodore Runyon, Ambassador to Germany, U.S. (Apr. 19, 
1895), in U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 536, 536 
(Washington, D.C., Gov’t Printing Office 1896); Letter from Frederick W. Seward, Acting Sec’y of 
State, U.S., to Nicholas Fish, Ambassador to Switz., U.S., (Aug. 20, 1878), in 2 WHARTON, supra 
note 1, § 183, at 396.  Cf. 13 Op. Att'y Gen. 89, 91 (1869) (acknowledging the common-law rule).   
 145. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 716 (1893); The Slaughter-House 
Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 95 (1872) (Field, J., dissenting); Gee Fook Sing v. United States, 49 F. 
146, 147-48 (9th Cir. 1892); In re Wy Shing, 36 F. 553 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1888); In re Yung Sing Hee, 
36 F. 437, 438 (C.C.D. Or. 1888); Ex parte Chin King, 35 F. 354, 355 (C.C.D. Or. 1888); In re 
Look Tin Sing, 21 F. 905, 906 (C.C.D. Cal. 1884); United States v. Anthony, 24 F. Cas. 829, 830 
(C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1873); In re Rodriguez, 81 F. 337, 353 (W.D. Tex. 1897); In re Wong Kim Ark, 71 
F. 382, 386 (N.D. Ca. 1896), aff’d sub nom. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898); 
United States v. Osborn, 2 F. 58, 61 (D. Or. 1880); United States v. Elm, 25 F. Cas. 1006 (N.D.N.Y. 
1877) (No. 15,048); McKay v. Campbell, 16 F. Cas. 161, 165 (D. Or. 1871) (No. 8,840); In re 
MacFarlane, 11 Haw. 166, 175 (1897); Stadtler v. School Dist. No. 40, 73 N.W. 956, 959 (Minn. 
1898); State v. Jackson, 80 Mo. 175, 177 (1883); State v. Ah Chew, 16 Nev. 50, 58 (1881).  Cf. 
Town of New Hartford v. Town of Canaan, 5 A. 360, 361-64 (Conn. 1886) (affirming the common-
law rule).   
 146. See, e.g., 1 JOHN BOUVIER, A LAW DICTIONARY 769-70 (Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott & 
Co. 14th ed. 1878); HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, A DICTIONARY OF LAW 663 (St. Paul, West 
Publishing Co. 1891); WILLIAM C. COCHRAN, THE STUDENTS’ LAW LEXICON 156-57 (Cincinnati, 
Robert Clarke & Co. 1888); J. KENDRICK KINNEY, A LAW DICTIONARY AND GLOSSARY 410 
(Chicago, Callaghan & Co. 1893); 1 ROBERT L. LAWRENCE & STEWART RAPALJE, A DICTIONARY 
OF AMERICAN AND ENGLISH LAW 702-03 (Jersey City, Frederick D. Linn & Co. 1888).   
 147. Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884).   
 148. See id. at 109 (quoting United States v. Osborn, 2 F. 58, 61 (D. Or. 1880)) (emphasis 
added) (deeming U.S. citizenship “a political privilege which no one not born to can assume 
without [the United States’] consent in some form.”).   
 149. See id. at 99-100.   
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government, or the children born within the United States of 
ambassadors . . . .”150  United States v. Wong Kim Ark151 extended this 
reasoning to native-born children of aliens.  Because these children were 
born subject to American sovereign power, the Clause therefore entitled 
them to birthright citizenship.152   
E. The Original Meaning of “Jurisdiction” 
In sum, the bulk of the available evidence supports the orthodox 
interpretation of the Citizenship Clause.  Both antebellum sources and 
the Clause’s legislative history strongly suggest that the original 
meaning of “jurisdiction” was “sovereign authority.”  This conclusion is 
also consistent with the Clause’s original expected applications and with 
evidence from the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification debates.  
Further support for this conclusion can be found in post-ratification 
commentary regarding the Clause, and a long line of judicial decisions 
endorsing the orthodox interpretation.   
IV.  CRITIQUING THE CONSENSUALIST INTERPRETATION 
Besides the copious evidence favoring the orthodox reading of 
“jurisdiction,” there are other reasons to reject a consensualist 
interpretation of the Citizenship Clause.153  First, consensualism finds 
little support in antebellum citizenship law.  Nor do the legislative 
histories of the Citizenship Clause and Civil Rights Act buttress the 
consensualist reading.  Finally, most of the evidence from during and 
after ratification cuts against the consensualist interpretation.   
 
 150. Id. at 102.  But see FEERE, supra note 1, at 10 (quoting Elk, 112 U.S. at 102) (suggesting 
that “that government” referred to the U.S. government, not a foreign government).   
 151. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649.   
 152. See id. at 687-88 (embracing the orthodox interpretation on the basis of prior precedent); 
id. at 693 (concluding that, under this interpretation, the Clause granted birthright citizenship to 
native-born children of non-diplomatic aliens).   
 153. Owing to space constraints, this article primarily focuses on consensualist arguments not 
previously addressed in NEUMAN, supra note 1, at 171-80; Epps, supra note 1, at 361-62, 370-72; 
James C. Ho, Defining “American”:  Birthright Citizenship and the Original Understanding of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 9 GREEN BAG 2d 367, 372-77 (2006); Magliocca, supra note 1, at 524-25; 
Shawhan, Virtue, supra note 1 (manuscript at 30 n.99, 38 n.138, 44-54, 68 n.246).   
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A. Consensualism and Antebellum Citizenship Law 
As noted above, antebellum law generally accepted154 the common-
law rule that the Citizenship Clause constitutionalized.  In a novel 
challenge to this conventional understanding, a recent consensualist 
article contends that 1) the common law granted birthright citizenship 
only to children of citizens; and 2) aliens’ children received birthright 
citizenship via the 1802 Naturalization Act.155  Another argues that 
under antebellum law, individual consent to U.S. allegiance by alien 
parents was a prerequisite of their child’s birthright citizenship.156  
However, none of these contentions is correct.   
First, although some antebellum commentators favored jus 
sanguinis for all native-born persons, such views were rejected by the 
 
 154. The only exceptions to this rule were slaves, southern free blacks, and “American ante 
nati” born before the Revolutionary War ended.  See Inglis v. Trustees of Sailor’s Snug Harbor, 28 
U.S. (3 Pet.) 99, 120-27 (1830) (American antenati); Amy v. Smith, 11 Ky. (1 Litt.) 326, 334 (1822) 
(free blacks); 7 Op. Att’y Gen. 746, 749 (1856) (slaves).  Of course, free blacks’ exclusion was 
criticized for its inconsistency with the common-law rule.  See, e.g., Amy, 11 Ky. (1 Litt.) at 337-38 
(Mills, J., dissenting).   
  Indians’ exclusion from birthright citizenship was consistent with the common-law rule, 
because Indians’ immunities meant that they were not born under the sovereign power of the United 
States.  See Goodell v. Jackson ex dem. Smith, 20 Johns. 693, 710, 712 (N.Y. 1823) (Kent, C.J.) 
(emphasis added) (listing various laws to which Indians were not subject, and then concluding that 
U.S.-born Indians “are not our subjects, born within the purview of the law, because they are not 
born in obedience to us.”).  One consensualist argument suggests that federal law’s limited 
protection of Indians made this exclusion inconsistent with the common-law rule.  See SCHUCK & 
SMITH, supra note 1, at 64.  However, if the common-law rule could exclude diplomats’ children, 
despite the protection they received from federal law, then federal protection did not necessarily 
imply birthright citizenship for Indians.  See Act of Apr. 30, 1790, Ch. 9, § 28, 1 Stat. 112, 118 
(authorizing the imprisonment of “any person [who] shall assault, strike, wound . . . or . . . offer[] 
violence to the person of an ambassador or other public minister . . . .”).   
 155. See Mayton, supra note 1, at 234-35 (“[J]us sanguines was the underlying and organic 
rule of United States citizenship.”); id. at 252 n.134 (“[C]hildren of [alien] parentage routinely 
gained birthright citizenship under the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1790.”).  The obvious 
implication of this thesis is that, if the Clause codified the common-law, it codified a rule of jus 
sanguinis.   
Note that, although the 1790 Act was repealed, its provision automatically naturalizing minor 
children was reenacted by its 1802 successor.  Compare Act of Apr. 14, 1802, Ch. 28, § 4, 2 Stat. 
153, 155, with Act of Mar. 26, 1790, Ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103, 104.   
 156. See Charles, supra note 1 (manuscript at 9) (birthright citizenship requires parental 
allegiance); id. (temporary allegiance requires an oath).  He labels this consent “personal 
subjection,” which, in modern law, supposedly occurs via compliance with immigration laws.  Id. at 
29 (allegiance required “some form of personal subjection to government, not mere presence.”); id. 
at 42 (“[U]nlawful immigrants . . . . have not personally subjected themselves to the jurisdiction of 
the United States, [or] acquired the requisite temporary or local allegiance by complying with the 
immigration laws . . . .”).   
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common law.157  In two 1830 decisions, the Supreme Court did employ 
jus sanguinis, but only to determine the nationality of persons who were 
minors when the American Revolution ended.158  Moreover, the Court 
specifically limited these precedents to situations in which “a revolution 
occurs; a dismemberment takes place; new governments are formed; and 
new relations between the government and the people are 
established.”159  In the 1863 decision of Ludlam v. Ludlam,160 the New 
York Court of Appeals did remark that “permanent allegiance,” or 
“allegiance by birth,” depended upon “parentage,” and had to be 
 
 157. Compare 1 J. J. BURLAMAQUI, PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL AND POLITIC LAW Ch. 5, § 9, at 
213 (Thomas Nugent trans., Boston, John Boyle, Benjamin Larkin & James White 4th ed. 1792) 
(1748) (endorsing jus sanguinis for native-born children), 4 NATHAN DANE, A GENERAL 
ABRIDGMENT AND DIGEST OF AMERICAN LAW Ch. 131, art. 2, § 8, at 700 (Boston, Cummings, 
Hillard & Co. 1824) (similar), 2 SAMUEL PUFENDORF, DE JURE NATURAE ET GENTIUM LIBRI OCTO 
994 (C.H. Oldfather & W.A. Oldfather trans., 1934) (1688) (similar), JOSEPH STORY, 
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 48, at 59 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 5th ed. 1857) 
(similar), and 3 VATTEL, supra note 1, bk. 1, § 212, at 87 (similar), with Lynch v. Clarke, 1 Sand. 
Ch. 583, 673-83 (N.Y. Ch. 1844) (rejecting the jus sanguinis proposals of these commentators).   
 158. In general, persons who lived during the Revolution were allowed “a reasonable time” to 
elect between “remain[ing] subjects of the British Crown, or to becom[ing] members of the United 
States.”  Inglis, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) at 160 (Story, J., dissenting).  However, because a minor was 
deemed incapable of making such a choice, “his election [i.e., choice of nationality] and character 
followed that of his father, subject to the right of disaffirmance in a reasonable time after the 
termination of his minority . . . .”  Id. at 126 (majority opinion).  See also Shanks v. Dupont, 28 U.S. 
(3 Pet.) 242, 245 (1830) (noting that a minor during the Revolution “might well be deemed . . . to 
hold the citizenship of her father . . . .”).   
  In his Inglis dissent, Joseph Story rejected this use of jus sanguinis, and cited that 
principle only to buttress a conclusion he deemed fully-supported by English law.  Compare Inglis, 
28 U.S. (3 Pet.) at 126 (majority opinion), with id. at 170 (Story, J., dissenting) (“[I]f [Inglis] was 
born after the 4th of July 1776, and before the 15th of September 1776, he was born an American 
citizen . . . whether or not parents had at the time of his birth elected to become citizens . . . .”  ), and 
id. at 169-70 (citation omitted) (“Vattel considers the general doctrine to be that children generally 
acquire the national character of their parents, and it is certain, both by the common law and the 
statute law of England, that the demandant would be deemed a British subject.”).  But see Mayton, 
supra note 1, at 230 n.41 and accompanying text (representing Story’s citation of Vattel as an 
endorsement of jus sanguinis generally).   
  Note also that Shanks deemed place of birth relevant to eligibility for American 
citizenship and British subjectship.  See Shanks, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) at 245, 247.  But see Mayton, 
supra note 1, at 236 (deeming Shanks “consistent with jus sanguines.”).   
 159. See Inglis, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) at 120 (majority opinion).  See also Lynch v. Clarke, 1 Sand. 
Ch. 583, 683 (N.Y. Ch. 1844) (noting such cases’ focus upon “the anomalous state of allegiance 
produced by the Revolution . . . .”).  The “right of election” did reappear following some U.S. 
territorial acquisitions.  See Treaty with Russia, U.S.-Russ., Mar. 30, 1867, art. 3, 15 Stat. 539, 542 
(permitting Alaska inhabitants to elect American or Russian nationality); Treaty with the Republic 
of Mexico, U.S.-Mex., Feb. 2, 1848, art. 8, 9 Stat. 922, 929 (similar for Mexican Cession 
inhabitants).   
 160. Ludlam v. Ludlam, 26 N.Y. 356 (1863).   
33
Ing: Citizenship Clause
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2012
12- ING_MACRO.DOCM 7/12/2012  3:41 PM 
752 AKRON LAW REVIEW [45:719 
“transmitted from the parents to the child, or it could not exist.”161  Yet 
this reasoning only applied to U.S. citizens’ foreign-born children.162  
For births on American soil, the common-law rule remained in force.163   
Second, the 1802 Naturalization Act did not grant birthright 
citizenship to native-born children of aliens.  A provision of this law did 
automatically naturalize a minor resident child whenever one of his 
parents underwent naturalization.164  However, this provision was silent 
regarding its applicability to native-born children,165 and antebellum 
authorities consistently applied this provision only to children born 
abroad.166  Moreover, even assuming this provision did naturalize native-
 
 161. Id. at 364.  Note that, although such reasoning explained how citizens’ foreign-born 
children might obtain birthright citizenship, it did not rule out the possibility that “the nature of 
permanent allegiance” might permit native-born children to acquire “natural allegiance” via other 
means (e.g., the common-law rule’s emphasis on place of birth and sovereign authority).  Id. at 364-
65. 
 162. Before these remarks about allegiance and parentage, the court rhetorically inquired, 
“Now, upon what ground can allegiance in such cases be claimed?”  Id. at 364 (emphasis added).  
The “cases” in question concerned “children of English parents, though born abroad . . . .”  Id.  The 
Court construed American common law on the basis of its English predecessor.  Id. at 362.   
 163. See id. at 371 (acknowledging that, “by the law of England the children of alien parents, 
born within the kingdom, are held to be citizens.”); id. at 376 (“If we assume that the laws of Peru 
are similar to ours on the subject of citizenship, there is no doubt that [a child born there of a U.S. 
citizen] would be . . . regarded as a citizen of Peru.”).  See also Munro v. Merchant, 28 N.Y. 9, 40 
(1863) (stating that a plaintiff “born in this state of non-resident alien parents . . . . is prima facie a 
citizen . . . .”).   
  One consensualist suggests that Ludlam rejected Calvin’s Case, (1608) 77 Eng. Rep. 377 
(K.B.), a celebrated English precedent that endorsed the common-law rule.  Mayton, supra note 1, 
at 235, 239.  In fact, however, Ludlam specifically stated that its “conclusion [regarding the 
nationality of citizens’ foreign-born children] needs no other support than the principles laid down 
in Calvin’s case.”  Ludlam, 26 N.Y. at 365.   
 164. See Act of Apr. 14, 1802, Ch. 28, § 4, 2 Stat. 153, 155 (“[C]hildren of persons duly 
naturalized under any of the laws of the United States . . . being under the age of twenty-one years, 
at the time of their parents being so naturalized or admitted to the rights of citizenship, shall, if 
dwelling in the United States, be considered as citizens of the United States . . . .”).   
 165. See Mayton, supra note 1, at 233 (emphasis added) (“It mattered not whether these 
children had been born in the United States or abroad”).   
 166. See 10 Op. Att’y Gen. 329, 329-30 (1862) (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (citing Act 
of Apr. 14, 1802, Chap. 28, § 4, 2 Stat. 153) (“Under the 4th section of the act of April 14, 1802, to 
establish an uniform rule of naturalization . . . such children [of aliens who undergo naturalization], 
if dwelling in the United States, are declared citizens. . . . The section, of course, refers to children 
born out of the United States, since the children of such persons, born within the United States, are 
citizens without the aid of statutory law.”).  See also Campbell v. Gordon, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 176, 
183 (1810); Vint v. King, 28 F. Cas. 1200, 1216 (W.D. Va. 1853) (No. 16,950); State v. Penney, 10 
Ark. 621, 630 (1850); O’Connor v. State, 9 Fla. 215, 234-35 (1860); Lynch v. Clarke, 1 Sand. Ch. 
583, 679-80 (N.Y. Ch. 1844); West v. West, 8 Paige Ch. 433 (N.Y. Ch. 1840); Young v. Peck, 21 
Wend. 389, 391 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1839); In re Morrison, 22 How. Prac. 99 (N.Y. Ct. Com. Pl. 1861); 
Sasportas v. De La Motta, 31 S.C.Eq. (10 Rich.Eq.) 38, 46 (S.C. App.Eq. 1858); In re Conway, 17 
Wis. 543, 545 (1863).   
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born children, the resultant status still wouldn’t amount to “birthright 
citizenship” because antebellum naturalization was not retroactive to the 
moment of birth.167   
Third, individual consent by alien parents, via “announcing of one’s 
presence and taking an oath,”168 was not a prerequisite of birthright 
citizenship.  Admittedly, some antebellum authorities conditioned 
birthright citizenship of an alien’s child upon the alien’s “temporary 
allegiance” to the United States.169  However, under antebellum law, 
temporary allegiance was “imposed upon [an alien] by the mere fact of 
his residence,” and was not conditioned upon “domiciliation . . . [or] 
taking of an oath of allegiance . . . .”170  Hence, during the Civil War, 
Secretary of State William Seward characterized “the expediency of 
requiring oaths [of allegiance] from” aliens in Union-occupied rebel 
territory as both “doubtful” and unnecessary since even without such 
oaths, “[f]oreigners owe temporary allegiance to the authorities 
wherever they reside.”171  President Abraham Lincoln likewise noted 
that “all aliens residing in the United States” were obliged “to submit to 
and obey the laws and respect the authority of the Government,” but 
“cannot be required to take an oath of allegiance to this Government . . . 
 
 167. For example, Priest v. Cummings, 20 Wend. 338 (N.Y. 1838), denied that “the effect of 
naturalization under the general acts of congress . . . can retroact so as to divest rights which have 
been acquired by others previous to such naturalization.”  Id. at 345.  See also People v. Conklin, 2 
Hill 67, 70 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1841); Keenan v. Keenan, 41 S.C.L. (7 Rich.) 345, 350-51 (S.C.App.L. 
1854); Vaux v. Nesbit, 6 S.C.Eq. (1 McCord Eq.) 352, 372-73 (S.C.App. 1826).  Executive-branch 
rulings also denied naturalization’s retroactivity.  See, e.g., 3 A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 
401, at 424 (John Bassett Moore ed., 1906).   
 168. Charles, supra note 1 (manuscript at 9).   
 169. See Inglis v. Trustees of Sailor’s Snug Harbor, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 99, 164 (1830) (Story, J., 
dissenting) (emphasis added) (“[A]t the common law . . . the children even of aliens born in a 
country, while the parents are resident there . . .  and owing a temporary allegiance thereto, are 
subjects by birth.”); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 87 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “temporary allegiance” 
as “[t]he impermanent allegiance owed to a state by a resident alien during the period of 
residence.”).  But see Lynch v. Clarke, 1 Sand Ch. 583, 663 (N.Y. Ch. 1844) (deeming “the 
situation of [a child’s] parents” irrelevant to birthright citizenship); 10 Op. Att’y Gen. 382, 399 
(1862) (similar).   
 170. Webster, supra note 1, at 526.  Because Webster also viewed the “duty of obedience to 
the laws,” as “arising from local and temporary allegiance,” id., fulfilling that duty could not have 
been a prerequisite for that allegiance.  But see Charles, supra note 1 (manuscript at 9) (suggesting 
that someone who “violated any federal statute” could not owe temporary allegiance).  Although 
Webster mentioned “residence,” Webster, supra note 1, at 526, in antebellum law U.S. domicile 
required U.S. “residence and the intention that it be permanent[,]” but not lawful presence, 
Shawhan, Domicile, supra note 1, at 1359.  This implies that lawful presence was not a condition 
precedent of U.S. residence either.  But see Charles, supra note 1 (manuscript at 42) (asserting that 
“lawful residence” required “complying with the immigration laws . . . .”).   
 171. Letter from William H. Seward, Sec’y of State, U.S., to Edwin M. Stanton, Sec’y of War, 
U.S. (Jun. 24, 1862), in RECORDS, supra note 1, at 172.   
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.”172  Hence, even assuming arguendo that alien parents’ temporary 
allegiance was a prerequisite of their native-born child’s birthright 
citizenship, individual consent still would have been irrelevant to that 
citizenship.  Such irrelevance, and the Clause’s declaratory nature,173 
makes it unlikely that the framers deemed consent to be part of the 
jurisdiction requirement.174   
B. Consensualism and Legislative History:  Indians, Aliens, and the 
Citizenship Clause 
As noted above, the legislative histories of the Citizenship Clause 
and the Civil Rights Act contain many statements consistent with the 
orthodox interpretation.175  By way of response, consensualists cite 
excerpts from these histories in an attempt to buttress the consensualist 
interpretation.176  However, when these excerpts are read in context, they 
provide little support for consensualism.   
1. Lyman Trumbull and Allegiance 
When discussing tribal Indians, Trumbull seemingly defined the 
jurisdiction requirement as “not owing allegiance to anybody else.”177  
Consensualists cite this statement as proof that the Citizenship Clause 
excludes children of persons owing a foreign allegiance.178  This seems 
unlikely, however, given Trumbull’s previous equation of “jurisdiction” 
with “sovereign power,” and his endorsement of birthright citizenship 
for aliens’ children.179  More likely, when Trumbull mentioned 
 
 172. Abraham Lincoln, General Orders, No. 82 (Jul. 21, 1862), in RECORDS, supra note 1, at 
234, 235.   
 173. See supra note 28.   
 174. But see Charles, supra note 1 (manuscript at 18) (arguing that the Clause required 
“personal subjection” or consent).   
 175. See supra Parts III.A-B.   
 176. See, e.g., SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 1, at 74-83.   
 177. GLOBE, supra note 1, at 2893 (statement of Sen. Trumbull, R-Ill.) (“What do we mean by 
‘subject to the jurisdiction of the United States?’  Not owing allegiance to anybody else.”).  See also 
id. at 2894 (statement of Sen. Trumbull, R-Ill.) (“[Indians] are not subject to our jurisdiction in the 
sense of owing allegiance solely to the United States.”).   
 178. See, e.g., SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 1, at 81-82.   
 179. See GLOBE, supra note 1, at 498 (statement of Sen. Trumbull, R-Ill.) (noting that the Civil 
Rights Act granted birthright citizenship to Chinese immigrants’ children); id. at 1488 (statement of 
Sen. Trumbull, R-Ill.) (suggesting that the United States ought to “by legislation, without attempting 
to get up treaties in any shape, bring [Indians] within our jurisdiction, and extend our laws over 
them.”)  Notably, when Trumbull proposes bringing Indians “within our jurisdiction,” he doesn’t 
mention demanding allegiance of them or making them citizens; rather, he proposes “extend[ing] 
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“allegiance,” he was referring to what the Supreme Court, in Elk v. 
Wilkins, subsequently labeled the “immediate allegiance” of Indians to 
their tribes.180  Ordinarily, “immediate allegiance” was the allegiance 
owed by persons directly subject to U.S. sovereign power;181 and was 
either the permanent allegiance of citizens within U.S. territory, or the 
temporary allegiance of resident aliens.182  However, because a tribal 
Indian’s child was also partially subject to the tribe’s sovereign power, 
the child owed a “partial [tribal] allegiance” that was an “[immediate] 
allegiance [owed] to anybody else.”183  Therefore, he was excluded from 
birthright citizenship.   
By contrast, although an alien’s U.S.-born child may owe 
permanent allegiance to his parent’s country of origin,184 in the United 
 
our laws over them.”  Id.  This implies an orthodox interpretation of “jurisdiction,” not a 
consensualist one.   
 180. See Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 99 (1884) (“[M]embers of those [Indian] tribes owed 
immediate allegiance to their several tribes . . . .”).   
 181. See Elk, 112 U.S. at 102 (noting that persons “completely subject to [the United States’] 
political jurisdiction . . . ow[e] them direct and immediate allegiance.”); Green, supra note 1, at 34 
(“[I]n English and American political thought . . . . [t]he government has a duty to protect those in 
its jurisdiction, and the subject has a duty to maintain allegiance to the government . . . .”).   
  One scholar argues that “immediate allegiance” is an “assumptive take on allegiance [that] 
ignores federal plenary authority over immigration and foreign affairs.”  Charles, supra note 1 
(manuscript at 40).  However, “immediate allegiance” is consistent with both Supreme Court 
precedent, Elk, 112 U.S. at 102, and antebellum law, see Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 
(7 Cranch) 116, 139 (1812).  Moreover, the framers intended to restrict governmental power over 
citizenship, in order to prevent future legislative denials of black citizenship.  See GLOBE, supra 
note 1, at 2896 (statement of Sen. Howard, R-Mich.) (“We desired to put this question of citizenship 
. . . beyond the legislative power of [opponents], who would pull the whole system up by the roots 
and destroy it, and expose the freedmen again to the oppressions of their old masters.”).   
  Nor does the orthodox interpretation limit federal power “to exclude non-citizens,” 
Charles, supra note 1, (manuscript at 40), because courts have consistently affirmed deportations of 
illegal alien parents with U.S. citizen children.  See Amanda Colvin, Comment, Birthright 
Citizenship in the United States:  Realities of De Facto Deportation and International Comparisons 
Toward Proposing a Solution, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 219, 226-27 (2008) (discussing such 
precedents); Jessie M. Mahr, Comment, Protecting Our Vulnerable Citizens:  Birthright Citizenship 
and the Call for Recognition of Constructive Deportation, 32 S. ILL. U. L.J. 723, 730-35 (2008) 
(similar).   
 182. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 87 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “permanent allegiance” as 
“[t]he lasting allegiance owed to a state by its citizens or subjects,” and “temporary allegiance” as 
“[t]he impermanent allegiance owed to a state by a resident alien during the period of residence.”).   
 183. GLOBE, supra note 1, at 2893 (statement of Sen. Trumbull, R-Ill.) (emphasis added) (“It 
cannot be said of any Indian who owes allegiance, partial allegiance if you please, to some other 
Government that he is ‘subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.’”); Green, supra note 1, at 34 
(noting that an individual owed allegiance in exchange for the protection provided by his subjection 
to a sovereign’s power).  Although the child of a “renegade,” non-tribal Indian did not owe tribal 
allegiance, the child did not owe “immediate allegiance” to the United States either, because of his 
immunities.  See supra note 121. 
 184. Of course, this assumes the availability of derivative citizenship to such children.   
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States the child is not subject to that country’s sovereign power.  Hence, 
the child’s foreign allegiance is not an “immediate allegiance,” and is 
not a proper analogue to Indians’ tribal allegiance.  Barring diplomatic 
immunity, on American soil that child is only subject to U.S. sovereign 
authority; thus, his only “immediate allegiance” is his natural allegiance 
to the United States.185  Because aliens’ native-born children do “not 
ow[e] [immediate] allegiance to anybody else,”186 Trumbull’s gloss on 
the jurisdiction requirement does not exclude them from birthright 
citizenship.   
Nor did Trumbull exclude transient aliens’ children from 
citizenship when he mentioned “a sort of allegiance . . . due . . . from 
persons temporarily resident . . . whom we would have no right to make 
citizens . . . .”187  Indeed, he had previously endorsed birthright 
citizenship for children of transient Chinese.188  In context, “persons . . . 
whom we would have no right to make citizens”189 clearly refers to those 
who were already aliens under then-existing law.  Because children of 
transient aliens were citizens at birth,190 Trumbull could not have been 
referring to them.  Antebellum law did, however, exclude children of 
diplomats;191 and Trumbull had previously mentioned “the child of a 
 
 185. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 87 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “natural allegiance” as “[t]he 
allegiance that native-born citizens or subjects owe to their nation.”).   
 186. GLOBE, supra note 1, at 2893 (statement of Sen. Trumbull, R-Ill.).   
 187. Id. at 572 (statement of Sen. Trumbull, R-Ill.) (emphasis added).  But see FEERE, supra 
note 1, at 7 (quoting GLOBE, supra note 1, at 572 (statement of Sen. Trumbull, R-Ill.)) (“The ‘sort of 
allegiance’ owed by an alien ‘temporarily resident’ in the United States, legally or illegally, would 
seem to include a duty to follow basic laws, but not the duty of loyalty demanded of a citizen.”).   
 188. See GLOBE, supra note 1, at 498 (statement of Sen. Trumbull, R-Ill.) (stating that such 
children would “Undoubtedly” be citizens at birth); id. at 2891 (statement of Sen. Conness, R-Cal.) 
(“The habits of [Chinese immigrants], and their religion, appear to demand that they all return to 
their own country . . . . Those persons return invariably, while others take their places . . . .”).   
  This original expectation—which other framers shared, supra note 98—undercuts 
arguments that the Clause excluded children of transient aliens, Charles, supra note 1 (manuscript at 
26), or children of aliens lacking a U.S. domicile, Shawhan, Domicile, supra note 1, at 1353.  Under 
antebellum American law, U.S. domicile required “the intention of making [this country] one’s 
permanent residence,” id., which the framers probably did not impute to putatively-transient 
Chinese aliens.   
 189. GLOBE, supra note 1, at 572 (statement of Sen. Trumbull, R-Ill.).   
 190. See, e.g., Lynch v. Clarke, 1 Sand. Ch. 583, 663 (N.Y. Ch. 1844); 10 Op. Att’y Gen. 328, 
328 (1862).  But see Charles, supra note 1 (manuscript at 14) (asserting that under antebellum law, 
“persons born of parents temporarily present could not . . . possess citizenship by birth.”).   
 191. See, e.g., Inglis v. Trustees of Sailor’s Snug Harbor, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 99, 155 (1830) 
(Story, J., dissenting).   
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foreign minister who is temporarily residing here.”192  This suggests that 
Trumbull was referring to diplomatic dependents.193   
What of Trumbull’s reference to “a sort of allegiance”?194  It was 
well understood that diplomats owed no allegiance to the United 
States,195 so it seems unlikely that Trumbull would imply otherwise.  
Even with diplomatic immunity, however, an ambassador and his 
household were still obliged to obey a receiving state’s laws, on pain of 
nonjudicial expulsion.196  Because public discourse closely linked this 
obligation with “allegiance,”197 it is not surprising that Trumbull would 
associate “allegiance” with diplomats’ duty to obey American law.  
Baldly labeling this duty “allegiance” would be incorrect, because 
diplomats owed no allegiance; but by mentioning “a sort of 
allegiance,”198 Trumbull could avoid this error, and simultaneously 
acknowledge diplomats’ obligation to obey the American law.   
 
 192. GLOBE, supra note 1, at 572 (statement of Sen. Trumbull, R-Ill.) (emphasis added).   
 193. See SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 1, at 80.   
 194. GLOBE, supra note 1, at 572 (statement of Sen. Trumbull, R-Ill.).   
 195. See 1 KENT, supra note 1, at *38 (“Ambassadors . . . are exempted absolutely from all 
allegiance . . . .”).   
 196. See 3 VATTEL, supra note 1, bk. 4, § 93, at 377 (noting that an ambassador’s diplomatic 
immunity “does not release him from the duty of conforming in his external conduct to the customs 
and laws of the country in all that does not relate to his character as ambassador; he is independent, 
but he has not the right to do whatever he pleases.”); id. § 94, at 378 (“If [an ambassador] injures the 
subjects of the State . . . . the injured persons should apply to their sovereign, who will demand 
justice from the ambassador's master, and, in case it is refused, will order the unruly minister to 
leave his domains.”).   
 197. See, e.g., Opinions of the Justices of Supreme Judicial Court, 44 Me. 505, 545 (1857) 
(Appleton, J., concurring); Inglis v. Trustees of Sailor’s Snug Harbor, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 99, 157 
(1830) (Story, J., dissenting); 1 ZEPHANIAH SWIFT, A SYSTEM OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF 
CONNECTICUT 13 (Windham, John Byrne 1795); Webster, supra note 1, at 526.  See also GLOBE, 
supra note 1, at 1832 (statement of Rep. Lawrence, R-Ohio) (“Citizenship . . . imposes the duty of 
allegiance and obedience to the laws.”); id. at 2799 (statement of Sen. Stewart, R-Nev.) (“Protection 
and allegiance are reciprocal.  It is the duty of the Government to protect; of the subject to obey.”); 
CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 2d SESS. app. at 81 (statement of Rep. Miller, R-Pa.) (“[N]o rebellious 
act on the part of the rebels could dissolve their allegiance to the government of the United States, 
and consequently they are amenable to its laws and can be tried and punished for their treason . . . 
.”).   
  This close association probably explains Trumbull’s concern that a provision defining 
citizenship in terms of allegiance might be construed to encompass diplomatic families.  See 
GLOBE, supra note 1, at 572 (statement of Sen. Trumbull, R-Ill.).   
 198. GLOBE, supra note 1, at 572 (statement of Sen. Trumbull, R-Ill.) (emphasis added).   
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2. Jacob Howard and Other Framers 
Other framers also made statements that, at first glance, might seem 
to support consensualism.  Upon closer examination, however, their 
statements support the orthodox interpretation instead.   
For example, although Sen. Howard did state that the Citizenship 
Clause would exclude “persons born in the United States who are 
foreigners, aliens, who belong to the families of ambassadors or foreign 
ministers,”199 the italicized text did not refer to native-born children of 
non-diplomatic aliens.200  Howard’s statement expressed what he 
deemed “the law of the land already,”201 and although the common-law 
rule excluded children of diplomats from birthright citizenship, this 
exclusion did not extend to all US-born children of aliens.  Thus, it 
seems likely that Howard simply omitted an “or” between “foreigners, 
aliens” and that each term was synonymous with “[persons] who belong 
to the families of ambassadors or foreign ministers . . . .”202  Moreover, 
even assuming Howard intended to exclude aliens outside diplomatic 
families, the descriptive connotation of his words suggests that 
“foreigners, aliens”203 referred to the common-law rule’s second 
exclusion:  children born to invading alien enemies in enemy-occupied 
territory.204  This exclusion was consistent with the orthodox 
interpretation because American law exempted invading armies from the 
invaded country’s jurisdiction.205   
Another seemingly-consensualist statement came from House 
Judiciary Chairman Rep. James Wilson, who noted that “children born 
on our soil to temporary sojourners or representatives of foreign 
 
 199. Id. at 2890 (statement of Sen. Howard, R-Mich.) (emphasis added).   
 200. But see FEERE, supra note 1, at 8.   
 201. GLOBE, supra note 1, at 2890 (statement of Sen. Howard, R-Mich.).   
 202. Id.  In the same way, I might refer to a group of Marine combat veterans by saying, 
“These men are Marines, combat veterans, who have served their country in wartime.”  In that 
sentence, “men,” “Marines,” “combat veterans,” and “who” all refer to the same category of 
persons.   
 203. Id. 
 204. See, e.g., Inglis v. Trustees of Sailor’s Snug Harbor, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 99, 156 (1830) 
(Story, J., dissenting); Craw v. Ramsey, (1670) 124 Eng. Rep. 1072, 1075 (C.P.); Calvin’s Case, 
(1608) 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 399 (K.B.); 2 KENT, supra note 1, at *42.   
 205. During the Mexican War, the United States deemed persons belonging to its invading 
armies exempt from Mexican jurisdiction.  See 2 JUSTIN H. SMITH, THE WAR WITH MEXICO 229 
(1919) (“Mexican tribunals were entirely free in dealing with Mexican affairs, though no one 
connected with our [United States] army could be tried by them . . . .”); id. at 70-71 (discussing 
Gen. William Worth’s concession, to Mexican courts, of jurisdiction over American soldiers, and 
Gen. Winfield Scott’s overriding of Worth’s action).  Judicial recognition of this principle came 
after the Civil War.  See, e.g., Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U.S. 509, 516 (1878).   
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Governments” were not “natural-born citizen[s] of [the United] States . . 
. .”206  Although it is possible that the italicized text referred to alien 
sojourners’ children, this seems unlikely, given Wilson’s many 
approving citations to the common-law rule, and the fact that the 
common-law rule’s leading antebellum precedent explicitly endorsed 
birthright citizenship for such children.207  More likely, “temporary 
sojourners” and “representatives of foreign Governments” referred to the 
same class of persons:  diplomats, who were, after all, temporarily 
present in the United States.208   
Likewise, when Sen. Howard mentioned “natural law” in the 
context of the Citizenship Clause, he was referring to the common-law 
rule, not consensualism.209  Nor was Sen. Johnson implying 
consensualism when he endorsed citizenship for children “born of 
parents . . . subject to the authority of the United States.”210  Because 
 
 206. GLOBE, supra note 1, at 1117 (statement of Rep. Wilson, R-Iowa).  Rather, Wilson 
deemed such children “native-born citizens of the United States.”  Id.  It is unclear what Wilson 
meant by this phrase.  Although Wilson distinguished “native-born citizens” from “natural-born 
citizens,” ordinarily the two terms were used interchangeably.  Compare id., with 1 BOUVIER, supra 
note 1, at 231 (“Citizens are either native born or naturalized. Native citizens may fill any office; 
naturalized citizens may be elected or appointed to any office . . . except the office of president and 
vice-president.”).  Possibly Wilson was recognizing that, if children of diplomats later underwent 
naturalization, they would indeed become citizens who were “native-born,” because they had been 
born on U.S. soil; however, they could never be deemed “natural-born citizens,” because they had 
not been citizens at birth.   
 207. See Lynch v. Clarke, 1 Sand. Ch. 583, 638 (N.Y. Ch. 1844) (concluding that “Julia Lynch 
was born in [New York state], of alien parents, during their temporary sojourn.”); id. at 663 (“I can 
entertain no doubt, but that by the law of the United States, every person born within the dominions 
and allegiance of the United States, whatever were the situation of his parents, is a natural born 
citizen.”).  See also GLOBE, supra note 1, at 1116 (statement of Rep. Wilson, R-Iowa) (quoting 10 
Op. Att’y Gen. 382-83 (1862)); id. (“The English law made no distinction on account of race or 
color in declaring that all persons born within its jurisdiction are natural-born subjects . . . . This law 
bound the colonies before the Revolution, and was not changed afterwards.”); id. at 1117 (quoting 
RAWLE, supra note 1, at 86); id. (quoting State v. Manuel, 20 N.C. 144, 150, 4 Dev. & Bat. 20, 26 
(1838)); id. (citing 2 KENT, supra note 1, at *25).  But see Mayton, supra note 1, at 244 (suggesting 
that Wilson intended to exclude children of alien sojourners from birthright citizenship). 
 208. GLOBE, supra note 1, at 1117 (statement of Rep. Wilson, R-Iowa).   
 209. Compare GLOBE, supra note 1, at 2890 (statement of Sen. Howard, R-Mich.) (emphasis 
added) (“[E]very person born within the limits of the United States, and subject to their jurisdiction, 
is by virtue of natural law and national law a citizen of the United States.”), with id. at 2765 
(statement of Sen. Howard, R-Mich.) (emphasis added) (noting that “national  law, or rather . . . 
natural law . . . recognizes persons born within the jurisdiction of every country as being subjects or 
citizens of that country.”).  But see Edward J. Erler, From Subjects to Citizens:  The Social Compact 
Origins of American Citizenship, in THE AMERICAN FOUNDING AND THE SOCIAL COMPACT 163, 
168 (Ronald J. Pestritto & Thomas G. West eds., 2003) (suggesting that Howard was referring to 
“the social compact basis of citizenship . . . .”).   
 210. GLOBE, supra note 1, at 2893 (statement of Sen. Johnson, D-Md.).  But see FEERE, supra 
note 1, at 9 (suggesting that Johnson endorsed consensualism).   
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Johnson did not require undivided parental allegiance, his proposal 
would not have excluded children of illegal aliens.  On the contrary, it 
would have included them because illegal aliens are subject to federal 
sovereign authority via taxation,211 Selective Service obligations,212 
liability for treason,213 criminal law,214 and (of course) immigration 
law.215   
 
 211. See STEVEN A. CAMAROTA, CTR. FOR IMMIGR. STUD., THE HIGH COST OF CHEAP LABOR: 
ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION AND THE FEDERAL BUDGET 25 (2004), available at 
http://www.cis.org/articles/2004/fiscal.pdf (“In 2002, illegal households paid a total of nearly $16 
billion to the federal government.”); ERIKA LUNDER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21732, FEDERAL 
TAXATION OF ALIENS WORKING IN THE UNITED STATES AND SELECTED LEGISLATION 3 (2008) 
(“[Illegal aliens] are subject to federal taxes and classified for tax purposes as either resident or 
nonresident aliens.”).   
 212. See OFF. OF PUB. & INTERGOVERNMENTAL AFF., SELECTIVE SERV. SYS., WHO MUST 
REGISTER CHART (2009), available at http://www.sss.gov/PDFs/WhoMustRegisterChart.pdf 
(stating that “Undocumented (illegal) aliens” are required to register with Selective Service).   
 213. This liability arises from illegal aliens’ obligation of “local allegiance” to the United 
States.  See Carlisle v. United States, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 147, 154-55 (1872) (holding that aliens 
owing “local and temporary allegiance” to the United States “were amenable to the laws of the 
United States prescribing punishment for treason . . . .”); Janusis v. Long, 188 N.E. 228, 231 (Mass. 
1933) (emphasis added) (“Aliens unlawfully within the country are subject to the criminal law and 
may be prosecuted and punished for its infraction according to the law of the land.  To that extent 
they owe allegiance to the laws of the government.”); CLEMENT L. BOUVE, A TREATISE ON THE 
LAWS GOVERNING THE EXCLUSION AND EXPULSION OF ALIENS IN THE UNITED STATES 426 (1912) 
(“[Illegal aliens’] temporary allegiance to the United States [is] complete and [gives] rise to 
reciprocal protection on the part of the state, unaffected by the fact that in order to enjoy and 
exercise the rights and duties incident thereto they [have] violated the immigration law.”).  But see 
Abrahms, supra note 1, at 483 (suggesting, without support, that “[I]llegal aliens cannot . . . be tried 
for treason against the United States government.”).   
  Although a federal magistrate judge recently asserted that “illegal aliens . . . lack . . . 
allegiance to the government of the United States,” Report & Recommendation on Defendant’s 
Motion to Dismiss Count 14 at *33, United States v. Boffil-Rivera, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84633 
(S.D. Fla. Aug. 12, 2008) (No. 08-20437-CR-GRAHAM/TORRES) (emphasis added), this opinion 
may have been using “allegiance” to mean either “permanent allegiance” or, more colloquially, 
“loyalty.”  Even if Boffil-Rivera was denying illegal aliens’ “local allegiance,” such a novel claim 
appears unworthy of much weight because it was neither supported by reasoned argument or 
citations of authority, nor accepted by most other courts.  See, e.g., United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 
643 F.3d 437, 441 (5th Cir. 2011); United States v. Flores, No. 10-178, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
120847, at *1-3 (D. Minn. Nov. 15, 2010); United States v. Luviano-Vega, No. 5:10-CR-184-BO, 
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98432, at *5-7 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 19, 2010).  But see United States v. Yanez-
Vasquez, No. 09-40056-01-SAC, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8166, at *18-19 (D. Kan. Jan. 28, 2010) 
(quoting Boffil-Rivera with approbation).   
 214. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-646R, INFORMATION ON CERTAIN 
ILLEGAL ALIENS ARRESTED IN THE UNITED STATES 18 (2005), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05646r.pdf (noting that, in fiscal year 2003, federal prisons 
incarcerated at least 18,581 illegal aliens who had previously been arrested 185,168 times).   
 215. See Magliocca, supra note 1, at 513 n.68 (“[I]llegal aliens are illegal precisely because 
they are subject to the jurisdiction of the authorities under federal immigration law.”).   
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Nor did Sen. Williams imply consensualism when he argued that 
tribal Indians’ exclusion from “the basis of [congressional] 
representation,”216 in Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment,217 implied 
their exclusion from the Clause.  One consensualist argues otherwise218 
because an 1867 treatise by Timothy Farrar supposedly limited 
“persons,” in both Section 2 and the Clause, to “citizens or aliens, 
natural-born or legally admitted . . . .”219  However, Williams’ 1866 
statement never mentioned Farrar.  Also, Farrar actually limited Section 
2 apportionment to citizens,220 and (unsurprisingly) failed to equate 
“persons” in Section 2 with “persons” in the Clause.221  Additionally, 
Farrar’s distinction between “natural-born” and “legally admitted” 
suggests that both terms modify “citizens,” with “legally admitted” 
meaning “naturalized” and the unmodified “aliens” including both legal 
and illegal aliens.222  Hence, even if the Clause only applied to children 
of “citizens or aliens, natural-born or legally admitted,”223 it would still 
grant birthright citizenship to illegal aliens’ U.S.-born children.   
Finally, Rep. Samuel Shellabarger never suggested that 
enslavement somehow “naturalized” illegally-imported slaves, 
such that they and their native-born children received citizenship 
via the Clause’s naturalization language.224  When referring to the 
 
 216. GLOBE, supra note 1, at 2897 (statement of Sen. Williams, R-Or.).   
 217. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (exempting “Indians not taxed” from congressional 
apportionment).   
 218. See Charles, supra note 1 (manuscript at 19-20).   
 219. FARRAR, supra note 1, at 214.   
 220. See id. at 403 (excluding “Indians” and “natural-born aliens” from “the basis of 
representation”).  Farrar’s mention of “citizens or aliens, natural-born or legally admitted,” id. at 
214, pertained to the original Constitution’s apportionment provision, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, 
which Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment replaced.   
 221. FARRAR, supra note 1, at 401-03 (discussing both provisions, but not drawing such a 
connection).  Equating “persons” with “citizens” makes the Clause a tautology.  Also, if an “alien” 
was “[o]ne born out of the jurisdiction of the United States, who has not since been naturalized,” 1 
BOUVIER, supra note 1, at 91, then by definition he could never be characterized as “born . . . in the 
United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 1.   
 222. FARRAR, supra note 1, at 214.  If “legally admitted” instead meant “compliant with 
immigration laws,” and modified only “aliens,” then “natural-born” would only modify “citizens . . . 
.”  Id.  Such a reading would (bizarrely) exclude naturalized citizens from apportionment.   
 223. Id.  If both “natural-born” and “legally admitted” only modify “aliens,” id., then at least 
some U.S.-born children of illegal aliens would fall under the Clause because “natural-born” 
“aliens,” id., would include any illegal alien who was an alien at birth, see Lambert’s Lessee v. 
Paine, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 97, 122 (1805) (argument of counsel) (using “natural-born aliens” in this 
manner).   
 224. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 1 (“All persons . . . naturalized in the United States 
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States . . . .”); ROGERS M. SMITH, 
CIVIC IDEALS:  CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 582 n.59 (1997) (“[A]ll 
whom the law had treated as American-owned slaves, whether illegally imported or not, were 
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freedmen whom the Civil Rights Act made citizens, Shellabarger 
did categorize these freedmen as “subjects” who occupied an 
“intermediate position” between citizens and aliens.225  However, 
he did not say that the Act made citizens of all “subjects,” and he 
never mentioned “illegal slaves.”226  In addition, even if “illegal 
slaves” became “subjects” when they entered the United States, 
this receipt of “subject” status could not be deemed 
“naturalization” because “naturalization” in antebellum America 
only referred to grants of citizenship.227  Moreover, if the Clause 
did indeed naturalize “illegal slaves,” why did Sen. Charles 
Sumner introduce an 1867 bill allowing black naturalization, and 
why didn’t opponents decry Sumner’s proposal as redundant?228   
C. Consensualism During and After Ratification 
The consensualist interpretation finds little support in the 
Fourteenth Amendment ratification debates.229  Several newspapers 
reported Trumbull as saying that “Indians living in tribes . . . were not 
subject to the complete jurisdiction of the United States.”230  However, 
because these reports lacked any mention of “allegiance,” this statement 
 
American ‘subjects,’ either by birth or by the brutal ‘naturalization’ that enslavement worked upon 
them.  Thus all former slaves, foreign- as well as native-born, were declared U.S. citizens by the 
Fourteenth Amendment . . . .”).   
 225. GLOBE, supra note 1, at 1160 (statement of Rep. Shellabarger, R-Ohio).   
 226. Id.   
 227. See, e.g., id. (“[T]hese subjects not owing any foreign allegiance, no individual act of 
theirs is required in order to [sic] their naturalization . . . no additional individual act of the subject 
is required in order to [sic] his citizenship.”); 2 BOUVIER, supra note 1, at 200 (emphasis added) 
(defining “naturalization” as “The act by which an alien is made a citizen of the United States of 
America.”).   
 228. See CONG. GLOBE, 40TH CONG., 1st SESS. 728 (1867) (statement of Sen. Sumner); id. 
(statement of Sen. Edmunds); id. (statement of Sen. Sherman).  Sumner was inspired by “a very 
hard case of a colored person who has been an inhabitant . . . for more than twenty-five years . . . .”  
Id. (statement of Sen. Sumner).   
 229. Admittedly, according to one newspaper report “Senators Conness and Howard . . . 
den[ied]” Sen. Cowan’s claim that “the children of gypsies, Indians and Mongols . . . would be 
elevated into American citizens . . . .”  The Reconstruction Resolutions, N.Y. HERALD, May 31, 
1866, at 1.  However, in the very next column of that issue, an account of the proceedings clarified 
that Conness said no such thing, and that Howard’s denial was confined to Indians.  Thirty-Ninth 
Congress, N.Y. HERALD, May 31, 1866, at 1.   
 230. See Congressional, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, May 31, 1866, at 1; Thirty-Ninth Congress, 
DAILY AGE, May 31, 1866, at 1; Thirty-Ninth Congress, DAILY NAT’L INTELLIGENCER, May 31, 
1866, at 2; Thirty-Ninth Congress, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 1866, at 1; Thirty-Ninth Congress, N.Y. 
HERALD, May 31, 1866, at 1; Thirty-Ninth Congress, N. AM. & U.S. GAZETTE, May 31, 1866, at 1; 
XXXIXth Congress, N.Y. TRIB., May 31, 1866, at 1; XXXIXth Congress-First Session, PUB. 
LEDGER, May 31, 1866, at 1.   
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likely referred to Indians’ jurisdictional exemptions.  Similarly, when 
John Bingham publicly stated that the Clause excluded native-born 
persons who “ow[e] allegiance to a foreign Power,”231 he was probably 
referring to the foreign allegiance of diplomats’ children.232   
Nor did the Expatriation Act of 1868 “embrace[] the consensual 
conception of citizenship”233 by endorsing the right to renounce one’s 
nationality.  Although English law equated birthright citizenship with 
perpetual, lifelong allegiance,234 the framing generation understood that 
“[perpetual allegiance] does not stand upon the same reason or principle 
as the common law doctrine of allegiance by birth, and does not follow 
from the adoption of the latter.”235  Hence, even though the Act’s 
drafters rejected perpetual allegiance, they accepted birthright 
citizenship.236  Congress passed this statute not as “a [consensualist] 
companion to the Fourteenth Amendment,”237 but in response to other 
nations’ contention that American naturalization did not sever a person’s 
preexisting foreign allegiance.  The Act’s repudiation of “any 
declaration, instruction, opinion, order, or decision of any officers of this 
government which denies, restricts, impairs, or questions the right of 
 
 231. The Constitutional Amendment, Discussed by its Author, CIN. COM., Aug. 27, 1866, at 1.  
See also Speech of Senator Wilson, of Massachusetts, in CAMPAIGN SPEECHES, supra note 1, at 34, 
col. 3 (similar); Speech of Sen. Lane, in CAMPAIGN SPEECHES, supra note 1, at 13, col. 6 (similar).   
 232. Cf. GLOBE, supra note 1, at 1152 (statement of Rep. Thayer, R-Pa.) (emphasis added) 
(“[E]very man born in the United States, and not owing allegiance to a foreign Power, is a citizen of 
the United States.”).  Because Thayer endorsed the common-law rule, the italicized text probably 
didn’t refer to non-diplomatic aliens’ native-born children.  See id. (“[T]hey who are born upon the 
soil are the citizens of the State.”). 
 233. SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 1, at 86.   
 234. See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *357 (footnotes omitted) (“Natural 
allegiance is such as is due from all men born within the king’s dominions immediately upon their 
birth. . . . Natural allegiance . . . cannot be forfeited, cancelled, or altered, by any change of time, 
place, or circumstance, nor by anything but the united concurrence of the legislature.”).   
 235. Lynch v. Clarke, 1 Sand. Ch. 583, 657 (N.Y. Ch. 1844).  Some consensualists suggest that 
Lynch rejected expatriation.  SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 1, at 60-61 (arguing that Lynch’s 
endorsement of birthright citizenship “was based essentially on the feared practical consequences of 
purely volitional citizenship—particularly a right of expatriation—for the stability of 
government.”).  In fact, however, Lynch suggested that “the common law rule of perpetual 
allegiance did not prevail” in the Founding era, Lynch, 1 Sand. Ch. at 657-58, and only rejected an 
“unqualified right of throwing off allegiance by birth . . . .”  Id. at 673 (emphasis added).   
 236. Compare CONG. GLOBE, 40TH CONG., 2d Sess. 1102 (1868) (statement of Rep. Ashley) 
(“[T]he doctrine of perpetual allegiance is entirely indefensible . . . .”), id. at 1104 (statement of 
Rep. Orth) (“In this country we utterly repudiate the common-law doctrine of allegiance.”), id. at 
1105 (statement of Rep. Clarke) (characterizing “the claim of perpetual allegiance or citizenship” as 
“one of those absurd contradictions to the necessities of our modern civilization which lingering 
feudalism has left in our midst.”), and id. at 1801 (statement of Rep. Van Trump) (condemning the 
“slavish doctrine of perpetual allegiance.”), with supra note 131.   
 237. EASTMAN, supra note 1, at 7.   
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expatriation”238 aimed to strengthen President’s hand vis-à-vis these 
nations, by foreclosing their inconvenient argument that American 
judicial decisions rejected expatriation.239  Finally, the timing of the 
law’s passage was the result of factors other than consensualism:  the 
end of the Civil War;240 constitutional affirmation of “the primacy of 
national over state citizenship”;241 and an angry American public, which 
was inflamed by British claims that naturalized Americans arrested as 
Fenians owed perpetual allegiance to Britain.242   
Nor do post-ratification authorities provide much support for 
consensualism.243  Consensualist commentators were strongly opposed 
by proponents of the orthodox interpretation.244  Isolated consensualist-
 
 238. Act of July 27, 1868, Ch. 249, § 1, 15 Stat. 223, 224.   
 239. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 40TH CONG., 2d SESS. 867 (1868) (statement of Rep. Donnelly) 
(“[W]e can never expect foreign governments to recognize our doctrine of expatriation . . . unless 
we adopt a declaratory statute upon this subject.”); id. at 868 (statement of Rep. Woodward) (“[I]t is 
not a matter of surprise to me that the English government should quote against us our own practice 
and precedents . . . .”); id. app. at 7 (Message of the President) (“British judges cite courts and law 
authorities of the United States in support of [perpetual allegiance] against the [pro-expatriation] 
position held by the . . . United States. . . . I . . . respectfully appeal to Congress to declare the 
national will unmistakably upon this important question.”).   
  This argument had some basis in reality.  See, e.g., Shanks v. Dupont, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 
242, 246 (1830) (“The general doctrine is that no persons can by any act of their own, without the 
consent of the government, put off their allegiance and become aliens.”).   
 240. TSIANG, supra note 1, at 83 (noting the Lincoln administration’s concern that vigorously 
defending expatriation abroad might lead to European recognition of the Confederacy; and 
American displeasure at “naturalized Americans calling upon the United States for protection from 
conscription in their native lands when they had just returned to their country of origin for the 
purpose of evading the American draft.”).   
 241. KETTNER, supra note 1, at 342; see also id. at 343-44.   
 242. See CONG. GLOBE, 40TH CONG., 2d SESS. 865 (1867) (statement of Rep. Donnelly) 
(noting “the arrests which are almost daily taking place of American citizens in the British islands . . 
. .”); id. at 4207 (statement of Sen. Conness) (similar); TSIANG, supra note 1, at 85 (noting the 
“mounting indignation in the United States over the severity of the British authorities in dealing 
with naturalized Irish-Americans who . . . . were arrested in Ireland as Fenians and political 
agitators.”). 
 243. But see Mayton, supra note 1, at 247-53; Abrahms, supra note 1, at 483-86.   
 244. Compare THOMAS M. COOLEY, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN 
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Ch. 14, § 1, at 243 (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 1880), 2 
WHARTON, supra note 1, at § 183, 393-94, GEORGE MERRILL, STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE 
JURISPRUDENCE AND THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 4, 4 n.1, 5 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1886), 
SAMUEL FREEMAN MILLER, LECTURES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 279 (New 
York & Albany, Banks & Bros. 1893), George D. Collins, Citizenship By Birth, 29 AM. L. REV. 
385, 391-92 (1895), George D. Collins, Are Persons Born Within the United States Ipso Facto 
Citizens Thereof?, 18 AM. L. REV. 831, 837-38 (1884), and Alexander Porter Morse, Letter to the 
Editor, Citizenship of Children of Aliens Born in the United States, 30 ALB. L.J. 519 (1884), with 
supra note 143.   
  Other commentators limited the Clause to children of U.S.-domiciled parents, but did not 
condition domicile upon compliance with immigration laws.  See, e.g., Henry C. Ide, Citizenship by 
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friendly dicta contrasted with far more numerous judicial holdings 
equating “jurisdiction” with “sovereign authority.”245  Secretaries of 
State Thomas Bayard and Frederick Frelinghuysen endorsed 
consensualism, but their successors revived the State Department’s 
original embrace of the orthodox interpretation.246  When an 1873 
Attorney General opinion stated that “[a]liens . . . are subject to the 
jurisdiction of the United States only to a limited extent” because 
“[p]olitical and military rights and duties do not pertain to them,”247 it 
was probably referring to certain aliens’ exclusion from conscription and 
voting rights,248 not consensualism.  When Secretary of State Hamilton 
Fish wrote that the Clause “makes personal subjection to the jurisdiction 
of the United States an element of citizenship,”249 “personal subjection” 
likely meant a person’s subjection to U.S. sovereign authority, not 
individual consent to allegiance.250   
Elk v. Wilkins251 was not a consensualist holding.  The Court’s 
statement that “no one can become a citizen of a nation without its 
consent” referred to Indian naturalization, not birthright citizenship.252  
When the Court defined the jurisdiction requirement as “completely 
subject to [the United States’] political jurisdiction and owing them 
direct and immediate allegiance,”253 the phrase “political jurisdiction” 
 
Birth—Another View, 30 AM. L. REV. 241, 250 (1896); Boyd Winchester, Citizenship in its 
International Relation, 31 AM. L. REV. 504, 504 (1897); cf. Shawhan, Domicile, supra note 1, at 
1353, 1359 (noting the irrelevance of governmental consent to domicile in antebellum law).  But see 
Charles, supra note 1 (manuscript at 21, 31-34) (deeming such compliance a prerequisite for 
domicile and birthright citizenship).   
 245. Compare The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 73 (1872), and Benny v. 
O’Brien, 32 A. 696, 698 (N.J. 1895), with supra note 145.   
 246. Compare Letter from Thomas F. Bayard, Sec’y of State, U.S., to Boyd Winchester, 
Ambassador to Switz., U.S. (Nov. 28, 1885), in 2 WHARTON, supra note 1, at 399, 400 (denying the 
birthright citizenship of an alien’s U.S.-born child), and Letter from Frederick T. Frelinghuysen, 
Sec’y of State, U.S., to John A. Kasson, Ambassador to Germany, U.S. (Jan. 15, 1885), in 2 
WHARTON, supra note 1, at 397, 398 (similar), with supra note 144.   
 247. See 14 Op. Att’y Gen. 295, 300 (1873).  This opinion also endorsed birthright citizenship.  
See id. (noting that “[p]ersons born in the United States” were to be “regarded as aliens” only after 
“becom[ing] subjects or citizens [of a foreign country] . . . .”).   
 248. These were limited to aliens who had declared their intention to seek naturalization.  See 
Act of Mar. 3, 1863, Ch. 75, § 1, 12 Stat. 731 (extending conscription to “persons of foreign birth 
who shall have declared on oath their intention to become citizens . . . .”); ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, 
THE RIGHT TO VOTE 33, 104-05 (2000) (discussing declarant alien voting and its linkage to 
conscription).   
 249. Fish, supra note 1, at 1189.   
 250. But see Charles, supra note 1 (manuscript at 22) (asserting that Fish meant consent).   
 251. Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884).  But see SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 1, at 84 
(suggesting that Elk implicitly endorsed consensualism).   
 252. Elk, 112 U.S. at 103.   
 253. Id. at 102.   
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referred to sovereign power, not consensualism.254  Because owing 
“direct and immediate allegiance” to the United States was an effect of—
not a prerequisite for—“complete[] subject[ion] to . . . political 
jurisdiction,” Elk unsurprisingly grouped these two concepts together.255  
Similarly, by mentioning tribal Indians’ “immediate allegiance to, one of 
the Indiana [sic] tribes,”256 Elk was not stating the reason for Indians’ 
exclusion from birthright citizenship.  Rather, Elk was merely noting an 
obligation incidental to the exclusion’s actual cause:  Indians’ immunity 
from federal sovereign power,257 which created a power vacuum that 
allowed their tribe to exercise sovereign authority over them.   
United States v. Wong Kim Ark258 is likewise inconsistent with 
consensualism.  The Court excluded “children born of alien enemies in 
hostile occupation” because occupation of American territory 
temporarily interrupted federal jurisdiction over that territory.259  By 
labeling allegiance and protection of the laws “reciprocal obligations,”260 
the Court simply restated the traditional American understanding that 
“[t]he government has a duty to protect those in its jurisdiction, and the 
 
 254. Other rulings evinced similar usage.  See, e.g., McAllister v. United States, 141 U.S. 174, 
187 (1891); Ft. Leavenworth R.R. Co. v Lowe, 114 U.S. 525, 540 (1885); Burbank v. Conrad, 96 
U.S. 291, 312 (1877); Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 610 (1857) (Curtis, J., dissenting); 
Florida v. Georgia, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 478, 510 (1854); Booth v. Clark, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 322, 334 
(1854); Hill v. Tucker, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 458, 466 (1851); Townsend v. Jemison, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 
407, 414 (1850); Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 422 (1849); Mayor of New Orleans v. 
United States, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 662, 722 (1836); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 592 
(1832); New York v. Connecticut, 4 U.S. (Dall.) 1, 4 n.3 (1799); Mellus v. Thompson, 16 F. Cas. 
1334, 1335 (C.C.D. Mass. 1858) (No. 9,405); United States v. Gratiot, 26 F. Cas. 12, 13 (C.C.D. Ill. 
1839) (No. 15,249); Spooner v. McConnell, 22 F. Cas. 939, 945-46 (C.C.D. Ohio 1838) (No. 
13,245); Moore v. Shaw, 17 Cal. 199, 218-19 (1861); Johnson v. Gordon, 4 Cal. 368, 373 (1854); 
Hayden v. Noyes, 5 Conn. 391, 395 (1824); Haight v. City of Keokuk, 4 Iowa 199, 213 (1856); 
Gibson v. Armstrong, 46 Ky. (7 B. Mon.) 481, 512 (1847); Stevens v. Thatcher, 39 A. 282, 283 
(Me. 1897); Lincoln v. Davis, 19 N.W. 103, 108 (Mich. 1884); State v. Oleson, 5 N.W. 959, 960 
(Minn. 1880) (Cornell, J., concurring); Petersen v. Chemical Bank, 32 N.Y. 21, 42 (1865); Whitford 
v. Panama R.R. Co., 23 N.Y. 465, 471 (1861); Clark v. Hills, 2 S.W. 356, 357 (Tex. 1886); Town of 
Milwaukee v. City of Milwaukee, 12 Wis. 93, 103 (1860).   
 255. Elk, 112 U.S. at 102.  As recognized in Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 
Cranch) 116, 139 (1812), immunity from American sovereign power eliminated one’s allegiance to 
the United States.  It follows that persons lacking such immunity would owe immediate allegiance.   
 256. Elk, 112 U.S. at 102.   
 257. Id. at 99-100 (noting Indians’ exemption from federal and state taxation, as well as from 
“[g]eneral acts of Congress . . . .”).   
 258. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898).   
 259. Id. at 682-83 (citing United States v. Rice, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 246, 254 (1819)).  But see 
Abrahms, supra note 1, at 485 (quoting Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 682) (“[T]hose who are there 
against the will of the sovereign, or in the Court’s words ‘the children of alien enemies,’ are not 
included [in the Citizenship Clause’s grant of birthright citizenship].”).   
 260. See Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 655, 679 (quoting Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 
162, 166 (1874)) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
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subject has a duty to maintain allegiance to the government . . . .”261  In 
discussing Wong Kim Ark’s U.S. residence and his temporary visits to 
China, the Court was explaining why Wong Kim Ark had not 
expatriated himself.262  In none of these instances was the Court 
endorsing consensualism; only Justice Fuller’s dissent did so.263   
V.  CONCLUSION 
Judging by recent scholarship, originalists rely upon various types 
of evidence to ascertain a constitutional provision’s original public 
meaning.  First, to shed light on the vocabulary from which the framers 
drew their terms, originalists try to reconstruct what the provision’s 
words and phrases meant before they were written into the 
Constitution.264  Second, originalists consult legislative history, to 
uncover what the provision meant to those who created it.265  Third, 
originalists examine the debates surrounding the provision’s ratification, 
to determine whether ratifiers assigned the same meaning as the 
drafters.266  Finally, originalists may consider post-ratification 
 
 261. Green, supra note 1, at 34.  Of course, except for diplomats and others with immunity, 
supra note 154, individuals in the United States normally “derive[d] protection from . . . the 
sovereign” via subjection to the “exercise of [the sovereign's] power,” Inglis v. Trustees of Sailor’s 
Snug Harbor, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 99, 155 (1830) (Story, J., dissenting).  But see Abrahms, supra note 1, 
at 485 (suggesting that “the government too must assent to the relationship [of allegiance and 
protection].”).   
 262. See Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 704 (“Upon the facts agreed in this case, the American 
citizenship which Wong Kim Ark acquired by birth within the United States has not been lost or 
taken away by anything happening since his birth.”).  But see Mayton, supra note 1, at 252 
(suggesting that this discussion was consistent with consensualism).   
 263. See Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 725 (Fuller, J., dissenting).  Notably, Fuller’s dissent was 
joined by Justice John Marshall Harlan, whose dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), 
had stated that members of “the Chinese race” were not “permit[ted] . . . to become citizens of the 
United States.”  Id. at 561 (Harlan, J., dissenting).  Although this statement may have referred to the 
exclusion of Chinese from naturalization, it may have also foreshadowed Harlan’s later vote in 
Wong Kim Ark.  Cf. Gabriel J. Chin, The Plessy Myth:  Justice Harlan and the Chinese Cases, 82 
IOWA L. REV. 151, 156, 158-59 (1996) (linking Harlan’s Plessy statement to his stance in Wong 
Kim Ark).   
 264. See Green, supra note 1, at 44 (noting that analysis of such usage “supplies particularly 
overwhelming evidence of what [a word or phrase] expressed when it was included in the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”); Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 
120 YALE L.J. 408, 460-77 (2010) (discussing usage of “due process of laws” in antebellum judicial 
decisions and public discourse).   
 265. See, e.g., MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE:  THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 57-91 (1986) (arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
legislative history supports incorporation of the Bill of Rights against the states).   
 266. See Aynes, supra note 1, at 86-98 (analyzing the Fourteenth Amendment ratification 
debates using mid-nineteenth-century speeches); David T. Hardy, Original Popular Understanding 
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interpretations of the provision, to “provide a cross-check upon our 
reading of [original] meaning.”267   
This Article has drawn from all of the above categories to show that 
“jurisdiction,” as used in the Citizenship Clause, originally meant 
“sovereign authority.”  This conclusion is consistent with antebellum 
usage of “jurisdiction,” and with the Clause’s legislative history.  It is 
further buttressed by sources from the Fourteenth Amendment 
ratification debate, and the bulk of post-ratification evidence.  By 
contrast, the consensualist interpretation finds relatively little support in 
antebellum law, legislative history, the ratification debates, or post-
ratification sources.  With the bulk of originalist evidence favoring the 
orthodox interpretation, we can therefore conclude that “jurisdiction” 
originally meant “sovereign authority.”  U.S.-born children of illegal 
aliens are subject to the sovereign power of the United States; as such, 
they are entitled to birthright citizenship under the original meaning of 
the Citizenship Clause.   
 
of the 14th Amendment As Reflected in the Print Media of 1866-68, 30 WHITTIER L. REV. 695 
(2009) (similar); Wildenthal, supra note 1, at 1589-1615 (similar).   
 267. Michael D. Ramsey, Textualism and War Powers, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1543, 1569 (2002).  
But see Aynes, supra note 1, at 100 (observing that “post-ratification statements are of little or no 
weight. . . .”).   
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